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MINORS, MEDICAL TREATMENT, AND INTERSPOUSAL
DISAGREEMENT: SHOULD SOLOMON
SPLIT THE CHILD?
INTRODUCTION
Recently, the Illinois Supreme Court confronted the unique issue of whether
two minor twins could be compelled, absent the consent of their natural
mother, to donate bone marrow for the benefit of their dying half-brother.1
The noncustodial, biological father of these twins asked their mother, the cus-
todial parent, to consent to an operation designed to save the life of his son, a
child completely unrelated to the natural mother.' After the twins' mother
refused, the father petitioned the court to allow the twins to participate in this
procedure. The Illinois Supreme Court, affirming the trial court's decision,
found this procedure was not in the twins' best interests and denied the fa-
ther's petition.3 Although this case of first impression generated a new rule of
law applicable under similar factual conditions, its disposition ultimately
rested on established legal principles." -This conclusion, however, does not di-
minish the legal significance of this case, which is found in the unresolved
issue that it forces us to consider.
A central feature in the Illinois case of Curran v. Bosze was the disagree-
ment between two natural parents over a proposed course of medical treat-
ment for their children.5 The court's resolution of the dispute, however, was
colored by the nature of the marital relationship. In the Curran case, the par-
ents had contractually established the parameters of their respective parental
interests and responsibilities, and, as such, the mother had the right to the
exclusion of the father to consent to the children's medical care.6 The court,
therefore, did not have the opportunity to address the more complex scenario
1. Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319 (II1. 1990); see infra notes 11-24 and accompanying text
(discussing the case in full).
2. Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1321.
3. Id. at 1345.
4. The decision was premised on the application of an Illinois statute that authorizes limitation
of the custodial parent's authority where its exercise is clearly not in the child's best interest. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 608(a) (1989). The trial court, however, focused more significantly on
constitutional issues and explicitly held that this request would violate the twins' right to bodily
integrity and self-determination. Curran v. Bosze, No. 87 M1 4599, slip op. at 4-5 (I11. Cir. Ct.
July 18, 1990), affd, 566 N.E.2d 1319 (I11. 1990). Thus, while the Illinois Supreme Court af-
firmed the trial court's holding, the basis for its conclusion differed from that of the trial court.
5. The twins were asked to undergo a medical procedure. However, the purpose of the proce-
dure was to provide therapeutic benefit for a third child and not the twins themselves. Curran, 566
N.E.2d at 1321.
6. See infra note 13 and accompanying text (referring to the text of the agreement).
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suggested by the facts of this case. Specifically, Curran v. Bosze7 begs the
question of how to resolve parental disputes over the medical treatment deci-
sions for minors where both parents are equally situated with respect to the
right of consent. While, at first glance, this situation may appear to be the
product of an overactive legal imagination, two courts in the past several years
have been faced with this dilemma.8 The purpose of this Comment is to ad-
dress the sensitive issues that arise in these situations and provide guidance for
their efficient resolution.
The Background section begins with a discussion of the three known cases
involving disputes between parents over the medical treatment decisions for
their children. 9 This section also explores the relevant principles of constitu-
7. Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1321.
8. See In re Jane Doe, Civ. No. D-93064 (Ga. Super. Ct. Oct. 17, 1991) (published in Fulton
County Daily Report, Oct. 18, 1991); Soloveichik v. Soloveichik, No. 89 CH 215 (I11. Cir. Ct.
Jan. 19, 1989).
9. It is appropriate to emphasize that this Comment focuses solely on intrafamilial disputes.
There are other forms of disputes that concern medical treatment decision-making for minors, but
these disputes are typically between parent and state or parent and child. See generally In re Eric
B., 235 Cal. Rptr. 22 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the juvenile court could order a depen-
dent minor to undergo periodic medical monitoring to detect the possible recurrence of cancer
although parents objected on religious grounds); In re Phillip B., 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (Cal. Ct. App.
1979) (holding that the trial court could deny petitioner's request that the child be declared a
dependent of the court for the purpose of ordering heart surgery when the parents objected and
the surgery was risky), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 949 (1980); Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108
(Del. 1991 ) (holding that the child was not neglected when parents refused on religious grounds to
consent to chemotherapy that was painful, risky, and posed only a 40% chance of success); In re
L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716 (Ga. 1984) (identifying circumstances under which parents or legal
guardians of a terminally ill infant may exercise the infant's right to terminate treatment without
prior judicial approval); Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (Mass. 1978) (holding that the
court could take custody away from parents who refused to consent to chemotherapy treatment
for their child where treatment posed minimal risk to the child and offered hope for a cure for
otherwise fatal leukemia); In re Green, 292 A.2d 387 (Pa. 1972) (holding that when a child's life
is not endangered, the state cannot outweigh a parent's refusal to consent to treatment); Robert
Bennett, Allocation of Child Medical Care Decision-Making Authority: A Suggested Interest
Analysis, 62 VA. L. REV. 285 (1976) (reviewing the roles of minors, parents, doctors, and the state
in medical decision-making for children); Linda S. Ewald, Medical Decision Making for Chil-
dren: An Analysis of Competing Interests, 25 ST. Louis U. L.J. 689 (1982) (examining the
sources of the various rights and interests involved in medical decision-making for children); Jo-
seph Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk: On State Supervision of Parental Autonomy,
86 YALE L.J. 645 (1977) (exploring the role and limits of the law in protecting children from
parental exploitation in the provision or denial of medical care); Eve T. Horwitz, Note, Of Love
and Laetrile: Medical Decision Making in a Child's Best Interests, 5 AM. J.L. & MED. 271
(1979) (recommending that the state be required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the parents' choice of medical treatment would harm the child before the best interests test is
applied); Katherine A. Miller, Comment, Court-Ordered Medical Treatment for Minors: An Al-
ternative Approach To Protect the Child's Best Interests, 7 WHITTIER L. REv. 827 (1985) (focus-
ing on the difficulties of court-ordered medical treatment and suggesting flexible judgments de-
rived from expert testimony and substituted judgment); G. Emmett Raitt, Jr., Note, The Minor's
Right To Consent to Medical Treatment: A Corollary of the Constitutional Right to Privacy, 48
S. CAL. L. REV. 1417 (1975) (arguing that a child's constitutional right of access to medical
treatment must be given value when weighed against parental interests in caring for and control-
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tional and family law and then identifies the competing interests inherent in
interparental disputes over medical treatment decisions. Next, this Comment
discusses the two different standards used in surrogate decision-making for le-
gally incompetent individuals, including minors.10 This Comment analyzes the
"substituted judgment" doctrine and the "best interests" approach to deter-
mine which standard is appropriate for cases involving minors. In addition, a
discussion of the appointment and responsibility of a surrogate decision-maker
and guardian ad litem is included since these persons are often empowered to
make treatment decisions for incompetent individuals.
The Analysis component of this Comment is divided into two distinct seg-
ments. The first section focuses on the three major cases in an effort to suggest
the desired legal conclusions in this difficult arena. This section demonstrates
that when parents disagree over the medical treatment decisions for their chil-
dren, their strong interests in parental autonomy cancel each other out of the
equation. As a result, the sole inquiry concerns the best interests of the partic-
ular child, and any resolution of the dispute must engender this principle.
While the ultimate decision may be difficult, it nevertheless must be made.
The second prong of the Analysis concentrates on the process through which
these decisions are made. Implicit in this procedural analysis are efforts to
insure that the respective rights of all parties involved are preserved to the
greatest extent possible. It must be reiterated, however, that the minor's inter-
ests remain the paramount concern. It is, after all, his or her physical and
emotional health that hangs in the balance. In these situations, this Comment
reveals, an independent guardian ad litem should be appointed to represent the
child in any proceeding, formal or informal. Also, institutional ethics commit-
tees should be involved, not only to assist in effecting the best interests
calculus and to represent the interests of the medical profession, but also to
serve as a forum for informal arbitration. This suggestion promotes the more
pervasive need to resolve these disputes without resort to the adversarial
process.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Curran v. Bosze
Nancy Curran was the biological mother of twins, Allison and Jimmy Cur-
ran, who at the time of the action were three-and-one-half-years old." Nancy
had been the sole custodial parent of these twins since their birth. Tamas
ling their children and in freely exercising their religious beliefs).
10. It should be noted that the use of the term "incompetent" refers to all individuals who are
unable to consent to treatment. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 765 (6th ed. 1990). Legal incompe-
tence may be the result of disease, mental handicap, or age. Id.
11. Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 1990); see also Patrick Hughes & Robert Wood,
Comment, Curran v. Bosze; Disposing of an Incompetent Donor Consent Case: The Role of Pa-
rental Autonomy and Bodily Integrity, 24 J. HEALTH & Hosp. L. 88 (1991) (arguing that the
Curran court did not address the significance of judicial intervention into the fundamental sphere
of parental autonomy).
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Bosze was the biological father of the twins, but he and Nancy had neither
been married nor cohabitated. After Nancy sought and received a legal deter-
mination of paternity, the two parties entered into a parentage order, which
defined the respective parent-child relationships.12 Under the terms of this or-
der, Nancy received the "sole care, custody, control and educational responsi-
bility of the minor children."'
Tamas also had three other children. However, these children were not bio-
logically related to Nancy. One of these children was Jean Pierre, a twelve-
year-old boy who was at the center of this dispute. In 1988, Jean Pierre was
diagnosed with a rare form of leukemia known as acute undifferentiated leuke-
mia." After unsuccessful attempts to locate a compatible bone marrow donor
within his family, Tamas asked Nancy's permission to allow the twins to un-
dergo a blood test to see whether they were compatible donors. 6 If the test
results were positive, Tamas further asked that the twins be allowed to donate
bone marrow to save Jean Pierre's life. Nancy consulted with various individu-
als, including family members, parents of bone marrow donors, donors them-
selves, and a pediatrician. After concluding there was an intolerable risk inher-
ent in the procedure, Nancy refused to give consent for either the blood test or
the bone marrow harvesting procedure. In response, Tamas petitioned the Cir-
cuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, to override Nancy's refusal and compel
the twins to submit to the procedures against Nancy's wishes. The trial court
refused to grant Tamas' request, finding that such an order would violate the
twins' constitutional right to privacy. 6 Tamas then filed an emergency motion
for direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court. The court, however, remanded
the case so that a guardian ad litem could be appointed to represent the
twins.' 7 After hearing extensive testimony from both parents, numerous physi-
cians, and former donors, the trial court reaffirmed its original decision and
Tamas appealed.
Tamas Bosze argued that the trial court erred by not employing the substi-
tuted judgment doctrine in determining whether the twins should submit to
12. Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1320.
13. The parentage order also provided:
In all matters of importance relating to the health, welfare and education of the chil-
dren, Mother shall consult and confer with Father, with a view toward adopting and
following a harmonious policy. Mother shall advise Father of which school the chil-
dren will attend and both parents shall be given full access to the school records of the
children.
Id. at 1321.
14. This disease is also known as mixed lineage leukemia and is very difficult to treat. Id.
15. Bone marrow donation, like other forms of organ donation, requires significant biological
similarities between donor and recipient. These similarities are the factors that establish compati-
bility. If the requisite compatibility is missing, the donor will likely reject the donated organ. Id.
at 1333. Compatibility can be determined through blood testing procedures. Id. at 1321.
16. Curran v. Bosze, No. 87 MI 4599, slip op. at 5 (III. Cir. Ct. July 18, 1990), affd, 566
N.E.2d 1319 (|11. 1990).
17. Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1321-22.
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the procedure. 8 Ms. Curran and the guardian ad litem, however, argued that
this doctrine was unavailable in a case involving minors who had never been
competent to consent to the treatment. 9 As such, Ms. Curran maintained that
the best interests standard should govern the resolution of the dispute. The
court, recognizing that the substituted judgment doctrine governs surrogate
decision-making for incompetent individuals, nevertheless held that this doc-
trine was unavailable in the case at bar.2 0 Because it was not possible to estab-
lish the intent of the children through clear and convincing evidence, the court
found the correct approach focused on the best interests of the children.
In resolving this dispute, the court initially referred to the parentage order
granting Nancy Curran sole custody and control over her children."1 While
noting that Mr. Bosze had standing to challenge Nancy's exercise of parental
authority, the court determined pursuant to state statute that the limitation of
this authority was appropriate only where its unfettered exercise would clearly
be contrary to the best interests of the child.22 Noting that this case was one of
first impression, the court proceeded to identify three factors necessary for
determining whether donating bone marrow to a sibling would be in a child's
best interests:
First, the parent who consents on behalf of the child must be informed of
the risks and benefits inherent in the bone marrow harvesting procedure to
the child. Second, there must be emotional support available to the child
from the person or persons who take care of the child . . . . Third, there
must be an existing, close relationship between the donor and recipient [that
18. Mr. Bosze argued that two recent Illinois Supreme Court decisions mandated the use of the
substituted judgment doctrine. See In re Estate of Greenspan, 558 N.E.2d 1194 (II1. 1990); In re
Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292 (111. 1989). Both cases involved adult patients who were
incompetent to consent for medical treatment. At issue was whether the right to refuse nutrition
and hydration could be exercised. In Greenspan, the later Illinois Supreme Court decision on this
issue, the court held that surrogate decision-makers, through the doctrine of substituted judgment,
could exercise this right on behalf of the incompetent individual where it was possible to deter-
mine the incompetent's intent by clear and convincing evidence. Greenspan, 558 N.E.2d at 1202.
As such, Mr. Bosze and the guardian ad litem for Jean Pierre argued that the court should in-
quire into the decision the twins would have made had they been competent to do so. Curran, 566
N.E.2d at 1322.
19. Curran and the guardian ad litem for the twins maintained that it was impossible to discern
the future intent of three-and-one-half-year-old twins and, as such, the best interests approach was
required. Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1322.
20. Id. at 1326.
21. Id. at 1320. The Illinois Parentage Act enables parents to establish such contractual rela-
tions. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 2506 (1989).
22. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 608(a) (1989). Paragraph 608(a) provides:
Except as otherwise agreed by the parties in writing at the time of the custody judg-
ment or as otherwise ordered by the court, the custodian may determine the child's
upbringing including but not limited to, his education, health care and religious train-
ing, unless the court, after a hearing, finds, upon motion by the noncustodial parent,
that the absence of a specific limitation of the custodian's authority would clearly be
contrary to the best interests of the child.
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creates a corresponding] psychological benefit."
After finding the second and third prongs of the analysis were not met, the
court held that it was not in the twins' best interests to undergo this proce-
dure."' Consequently, the court denied Mr. Bosze's petition.
B. Soloveichik v. Soloveichik
In January of 1989, the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, was faced
with another unique and difficult case. 5 Miriam and Moshe Soloveichik were
the parents of a twelve-year-old boy, Yisroel, who was dying as a result of a
brain tumor. The disease had left him in a severely debilitated state, described
as nonresponsive. In simple terms, Yisroel was unable to move his limbs or
shoulders, had limited control over his facial muscles, and could not communi-
cate. 6 Moreover, Yisroel was drifting in and out of a vegetative state. His
prognosis for survival was equally dim. His physician believed that Yisroel was
likely to die soon. Although Yisroel had received extensive medical care for
approximately two years, these efforts had proven ineffective in stemming the
physical and mental deterioration caused by his disease.17
Unfortunately, another situation compounded the already tragic nature of
these circumstances. Yisroel's parents, who were married and living together,
could not agree on the appropriate course of therapy. Moshe, Yisroel's father,
wanted his son to have an operation to internalize the external shunt that
served to drain the fluid accumulating in his brain as a result of the tumor.2 8
Miriam, Yisroel's mother, felt any further surgical procedures would only pro-
long the dying process and subject Yisroel to more needless pain and suffering,
both mental and physical. 9 Moreover, the hospital's medical staff believed the
proposed surgery was medically inappropriate and could produce more harm
than good."0 After Moshe arranged for Yisroel's transfer to a hospital that
would perform the operation, Miriam initiated an action in which both parents
eventually sought a declaration of limited parental rights. Specifically, each
parent wanted the unilateral authority to grant or refuse consent for Yisroel's
medical treatment to the exclusion of the other.31 In addition, both the father
23. Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1343.
24. Specifically, the court found that Ms. Curran, by virtue of her refusal to consent to the
procedure, would not be able to provide the requisite emotional support. Id. at 1344. In addition,
the court noted the relationship between the siblings was too distant to supply the psychological
benefit necessary to authorize this procedure. Id.
25. Soloveichik v. Soloveichik, No. 89 CH 215 (I11. Cir. Ct. Jan. 19, 1989).
26. Affidavit of Dr. Kenneth Boyer at 2, Soloveichik v. Soloveichik, No. 89 CH 215 (III. Cir.
Ct. Jan. 19, 1989).
27. Id.
28. Verified Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive and Other Relief at 3,
Soloveichik (No. 89 CH 215).
29. Id. at 6.
30. Id. at 3, 5.
31. Soloveichik v. Soloveichik, No. 89 CH 215, slip op. at 7 (111. Cir. Ct. Jan. 19, 1989).
846 [Vol. 41:841
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as well as the hospital, which was named as a party-defendant to the action,
requested an independent guardian be appointed to make any future treatment
decisions for Yisroel.33
Soloveichik is distinguishable from Curran, although both involved parental
disagreements over medical treatment decisions. In Curran there was a par-
entage order defining the respective interests of the parents. By contrast, the
Soloveichik case involved two parents, both legally vested with the authority
to consent to their child's therapy, who were seemingly enmeshed in an un-
resolvable conflict over this decision. As such, the court was faced with the
task of extinguishing one parent's right to consent, albeit to a limited extent,
in favor of the other parent. Complicating this task was the fact that both
parents were found to be caring, loving, and responsible persons dedicated to
the welfare of their child.3 8 The court resolved this dispute by awarding Mir-
iam with a limited guardianship for the purpose of making medical treatment
decisions. 4
In arriving at this conclusion, the court first noted that under Illinois law,
minors under the age of fourteen were not permitted to make life-sustaining-
treatment decisions.3 5 The court held that these situations required clear and
convincing evidence of the minor's intent, even if the minor were found to be
legally competent.3 6 In Soloveichik, the court found this standard was not sat-
isfied. Because Yisroel's wishes were not a factor in the decision, the court
proceeded to employ the best interests analysis to decide whether further sur-
gery was mandated. Adopting a version of a test used by the Supreme Court
of New York County in In re Beth Israel Medical Center,3 7 the court articu-
lated twelve factors to consider in the best interests calculus:3 8
With respect to whether the burdens to a particular patient from prolonga-
tion of life 'markedly outweigh' the benefits, the following factors should be
considered:
1) the age of the patient; 2) the life expectancy with or without the proce-
dure contemplated; 3) the degree of present and future pain or suffering
with or without the procedure; 4) the extent of the patient's physical and
mental disability and degree of helplessness; 5) statements, if any, made by
the patient which directly or impliedly manifest his views on life prolonging
measures; 6) the quality of the patient's life with or without the procedure,
i.e., the extent, if any, of pleasure, emotional enjoyment, or intellectual satis-
faction that the patient will obtain from prolonged life; 7) the risks to life
from the procedure contemplated as well as its adverse side effects and de-
32. Id.
33. The court found it unnecessary to appoint a guardian ad litem because both parents had
displayed "extraordinary conduct" toward their child. Id. Thus, the court did not feel the appoint-
ment of a guardian would serve Yisroel's best interests. Id. at 20.
34. Id. at 20.
35. Cf. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, para. 4501, § 1 (1989) (delineating exceptions to the rule).
36. Soloveichik, slip op. at 9.
37. 519 N.Y.S.2d 511 (Sup. Ct. 1987).
38. Soloveichik, slip op. at 14.
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gree of invasiveness; 8) religious or ethical beliefs of the patient; 9) views of
those close to him; 10) views of the physician; 11) the type of care which
will be required if life is prolonged as contrasted with what will actually be
available to him; 12) whether there are any overriding state parens patriae
interests in sustaining life (e.g. preventing suicide, integrity of the medical
profession or protection of innocent third parties, such as children).3 9
Considering most of these factors, the Soloveichik court determined that the
benefits of the proposed surgery were markedly outweighed by its burdens,
even though this decision could hasten the dying process.'0 Because Miriam's
wishes were in accord with the judicial assessment of Yisroel's best interests,
she was awarded the limited guardianship to the exclusion of Moshe."'
C. In re Jane Doe
Jane Doe was a thirteen-year-old child who had always suffered from lim-
ited mental growth and ability.' In May of 1991, Jane was admitted to the
hospital after experiencing persistent swallowing difficulties and periodic chok-
ing episodes. Two weeks later, her condition deteriorated and she was placed
on mechanical ventilation. In early July, 1991, Jane Doe lapsed into a state of
unconsciousness. While the hospital's physicians were not sure of her exact
condition, they concluded:
[Jane suffered from a] neurological degenerative disorder . . . with substan-
tial atrophy of the brain and no reasonable possibility of a 'meaningful re-
covery' due to the fact that substantial portions of her brain are irreversibly
damaged, including the areas which control her cognitive functions, her abil-
ity to eat, swallow and breathe. . . . Jane Doe has no self-awareness, self-
control, capacity to relate to others or capacity to communicate or control
her existence.' 3
Jane's physician further stated that he was not sure whether she felt pain from
the life-support that she received, but opined that her death was imminent
without technological efforts."
Because Jane had no hope for a "meaningful recovery," her treating physi-
cian as well as the hospital bioethics committee felt Jane's continued treat-
39. Beth Israel Medical Ctr., 519 N.Y.S.2d at 517 (textual structure of quotation altered). It
should be noted that the court in Soloveichik expressly refused to adopt the sixth factor.
Soloveichik, slip op. at 14. The court felt it was inappropriate to consider this variable because it
would require a "quality of life" determination. Id.
40. Soloveichik, slip op. at 14.
41. Id. at 20.
42. In re Jane Doe, Civ. No. D-93064 (Ga. Super. Ct. Oct. 17, 1991) (published in Fulton
County Daily Report, Oct. 18, 1991).
43. Id., slip op. at 4. When asked the meaning of "no hope for 'meaningful recovery,' " Jane
Doe's physician responded, "The child may recover to the extent that she may again be able to
respond to deep pain, but there is no hope for recovery past that point." Id. at 3 n. I.
44. Id. at 4.
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ment, including life-support, was both inhumane and medically abusive." Ac-
cordingly, the committee recommended both the issuance of a "Do Not
Resuscitate" ("DNR") order and the discontinuation of all extraordinary life-
sustaining medical procedures. These recommendations were presented to
Jane's parents, but they did not agree on the course of her treatment. Jane's
mother felt the DNR order was appropriate. She was, however, ambivalent on
the issue of whether life-support should be discontinued."O Jane's father, on the
other hand, vigorously opposed both recommendations. In fact, he indicated
that every possible medical intervention should be used to keep Jane alive.47 In
response to this dispute, the hospital petitioned the Superior Court of Fulton
County, Georgia, for a declaratory judgment allowing the mother alone to
consent to the DNR order. In addition, the hospital requested an order permit-
ting a termination of all artificial and extraordinary means of life-support at
the direction of its physicians.
In denying both of the hospital's requests, the court identified and balanced
several constitutional precepts that operated in this unique set of circum-
stances. First, because parents are presumed to act in the best interests of
their children, the court found that parents are endowed with broad decision-
making authority.48 Moreover, the court stated:
[Plarental rights [are] fundamental and entitled to the utmost protection of
the law, they are fully vested in each individual parent, not shared as a
parental unit. The mother and father are each entitled to the full spectrum
of parental rights. The mother's rights with regard to the child are no
greater than the father's . . . and vice versa. 49
As a direct result of each parent's fundamental right to act on behalf of his or
her children, the court also ruled that the state could not interfere with the
exercise of these rights absent extreme circumstances, such as abuse or neg-
lect. 50 Finally the court noted that under both state and federal constitutions
there is a presumption in favor of life competing with the above-mentioned
interests and that this presumption is reflected in the laws protecting the
health and welfare of all individuals, especially society's most vulnerable mem-
bers.5 In reaching its decision in this context, the court held that this constitu-
tional guarantee must be recognized.
Balancing these factors, the court determined that Jane Doe must be kept
alive and that a DNR order was inappropriate.52 Because the parents could
not agree, the court found that granting Jane's mother exclusive authority to
make health care decisions would both violate her father's fundamental rights
45. Id. at 6.
46. Id. at 7.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 12; see infra notes 65-82 and accompanying text (discussing parental rights issues).
49. In re Jane Doe, slip op. at 16.
50. Id. at 14.
51. Id. at 18.
52. Id. at 18-19.
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as a parent and contravene the integrity of the family unit.5" In addition, the
court concluded that Jane Doe's continued treatment did not constitute abuse
and, as such, the state could not constitutionally interfere with the medical
decision-making process. 54 In the face of disagreement and medical uncer-
tainty, the court determined the balance must be tipped in favor of Jane's
right to life. Thus, until the parents reached accord, the court found it imper-
missible either to trample on their individual fundamental rights as parents or
to interfere with Jane's continued existence.
The problems caused by parents who disagree are unique and, as such, are
deserving of special attention. Before it is possible to determine the best way to
resolve these disputes, however, it is essential to identify the nature and scope
of the competing interests at stake in these controversies. These relevant inter-
ests are the subject of the next section.
D. Competing Interests-Children, Parents, and the State
In considering disputes over the medical treatment decisions for minors,
there are several sets of competing interests that come into play. 55 Specifically,
three parties have important stakes in the. outcome of the dispute.56 These
parties are the minor child, his or her parents, and the state. All of these
interests must be considered in attempting to resolve the disputes.5 7 The
court's role is to effect the balancing process so that the least intrusive solution
can be achieved. An examination of each of these competing interests follows.
1. Minors
Minors do not possess the full panoply of constitutional and common law
rights that adults enjoy.58 For example, minors are not allowed to vote, drink
53. Id. at 21.
54. Id. at 15.
55. While this Comment focuses on disputes between natural parents, other forms of disputes
are possible, specifically parent-state and parent-child. For a discussion of these issues, see gener-
ally Ewald, supra note 9; Goldstein, supra note 9; Horwitz, supra note 9; Andrew Kleinfeld, The
Balance of Power Among Infants, Their Parents and the State, 4 FAM, L.Q. 319 (1970); Stuart J.
Baskin, Comment, State Intrusion into Family Affairs: Justification and Limitations, 26 STAN. L.
REv. 1353 (1974); Miller, supra note 9; Raitt, supra note 9; Elizabeth J. Sher, Comment, Choos-
ingfor Children: Adjudicating Medical Care Disputes Between Parents and the State, 58 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 157 (1983).
56. There is an additional party with a vested interest in the outcome of the dispute. Because
the disagreement involves medical treatment, the medical profession is necessarily drawn into the
controversy. While the state is normally entrusted with safeguarding the integrity of the profes-
sion, the self-regulating characteristics of the profession empower health care providers to oversee
the protection of their interests. In these situations, health care providers can supply valuable
information as well as define the ethical limits placed on their conduct.
57. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944) (commenting on the conflict be-
tween the parental interest in household authority and child rearing and the state's interest in the
welfare of children).
58. Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1156, 1358
(1980) [hereinafter Developments in the Law]. The commentator notes:
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alcohol, drive a car below a certain age, or enter into binding contracts. The
reasoning underlying these restrictions lies in the presumption that minors, by
virtue of their age and inexperience, are not as capable as adults either to
understand the risks and consequences of their actions or to exercise sound
judgment in making important decisions.59 This same reasoning also applies to
the context of medical decision-making and, as such, minors normally cannot
give valid consent for these procedures.6" As will be shown, other parties, usu-
ally the parents, are entrusted to make the important decisions necessary to
the health and welfare of the child.
Despite these limitations on the minor's exercise of personal autonomy, mi-
nors do possess certain rights that are afforded judicial protection.61 As the
Supreme Court noted in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,6 2 "Constitutional
rights do not mature and come into being magically when one obtains some
state defined age of majority."63 One of these rights is the right to privacy,
which encompasses the right to bodily integrity and self-determination." Al-
It is important to distinguish the two reasons why a child may not be entitled to the
full constitutional protection that an adult would receive under similar circumstances.
First, a child may possess a constitutional right of lesser magnitude than an adult
possesses. This might be the case if the values animating a given constitutional provi-
sion were not as applicable to children as adults. Second, the state may be able to
assert interests to support its treatment of children that it could not assert with re-
spect to adults. This would be the case if the state's treatment of children fell within
its police power or parens patriae power while the treatment of identically situated
adults did not come within either category.
Id.
59. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
60. There are, however, a number of exceptions to this general rule. One exception involves
emergency situations in which the parent is unavailable to consent. Here, the physician can treat
the minor without receiving any consent. WILLIAM L. 'PRossER & W. PAGE KEETON, LAW OF
TORTS § 18, at 117-18 (5th ed. 1984). There are other exceptions to this rule as well. Certain
jurisdictions allow minors to consent for specific kinds of treatment, such as abortion, venereal
disease, and alcoholism. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (abortion); Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622 (1979) (abortion); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (abortion);
see also Ewald, supra note 9, at 701 (discussing statutes that allow children to consent to treat-
ment for venereal disease, drug addiction, and pregnancy). In addition, emancipated and mature
minors have the ability to consent to all forms of medical treatment. Id. at 701-04. For the pur-
pose of this Comment, both the emancipated and the mature minor are important to the applica-
tion of the substituted judgment doctrine. See infra notes 175-78 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the emancipated and mature minor doctrines).
61. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (right of minor to jury trial); In
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (right of minor in juvenile detention proceeding to due process, con-
frontation, and privilege against self-incrimination); Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (right of mature minor
to consent to abortion); E.G. v. E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (I11. 989) (right of privacy, freedom of
expression, freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, and right to procedural due process).
62. 428 U.S. 52, 70 (1976) (discussing the right of a mature minor to consent to an abortion).
63. Id. at 74.
64. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Roe decision followed a line of cases establish-
ing the contours of the right to privacy. Implicit in Roe is recognition of the right to bodily
integrity and personal autonomy. The right of privacy in the abortion context was extended to
minors in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (holding that parents do not pos-
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though the exercise of this right is often delegated to a third party, the re-
quirement of third party consent indicates that a protected interest both exists
and is protected by the third party. As such, barring emergency circum-
stances, minors cannot be compelled to undergo medical treatment in the ab-
sence of valid consent. Problems can arise, however, as to the appropriate
source of this requisite consent, and it is in these situations that a tension can
exist between the other two parties: the parents and the state.
2. Parents
The traditional source of consent in matters concerning the medical treat-
ment of minors has been the child's parents."' Parents have long been en-
trusted with the responsibility of making all decisions necessary for raising
their children. 6 In fact, the right of parents to make these decisions free from
unwarranted state intrusion enjoys constitutional protection. As the Supreme
Court stated in Parham v. J.R., "Our constitutional system long ago rejected
any notion that a child is 'the mere creature of the state' and, on the contrary,
asserted that parents generally 'have the right, coupled with the high duty, to
recognize and prepare [their children] for additional obligations.'"68 Conse-
quently, parents possess a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody,
and management of their children that is protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. 9 This interest is known as the right to
privacy in matters of the family and is afforded the same degree of protection
sess absolute veto power over a minor's decision to seek an abortion); see also Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622 (1972) (recognizing the constitutional right of a minor to have direct access to
courts for the purpose of proving that he or she is mature enough to make an abortion decision
absent parental consent).
65. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) ("Our jurisprudence historically has re-
flected Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over
minor children."); Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 638 ("[Wle cannot ignore that ... deeply rooted in our
Nation's history and tradition is the belief that the parental role implies a substantial measure of
authority over one's children. Indeed, 'constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized
that the parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is
basic in the structure of our society.'" (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639
(1968))); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) ("The history and culture of Western Civili-
zation reflects a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their
children.").
66. Parham, 442 U.S. at 602.
67. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (19E2) (decision regarding matters of family ac-
corded fundamental status). See generally Parham, 442 U.S. 584 (right of parents to make
mental health care decisions); Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (right of parents to direct religious upbring-
ing); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (right of parents to direct their child's
education); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right of parents to raise children).
68. Parham, 442 U.S. at 602 (quoting Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535).
69. In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 801 (1979) (citing United States v. Orito, 413 U.S.
139, 142 (1973)); see also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("It is cardinal
with us that the custody, care, and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary
function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor
hinder.").
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as all other recognized fundamental rights. 70
Two basic presumptions are implicit in the rule guaranteeing the right to
family privacy in child rearing. First, parents are in the best position to assess
the needs of their children. 7' This is primarily due to the unique and intimate
nature of the parent-child relationship. Parents are involved in the day-to-day
events that shape the child's existence as well as ready the child for indepen-
dent life. Also, "Parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience,
and capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult decisions."'72 Fi-
nally, parents are constantly imparting a personal system of values upon the
child and are better able to insure that the child's needs will be met with
respect to this set of ethics. 73
The second presumption inherent in the right to family privacy is that par-
ents act in their child's best interests.74 Vast experience has shown that par-
ents tend to act in manners consistent with the child's welfare.75 The "natural
bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children."1
76
70. When examining cases involving state interference with fundamental rights, including the
right to privacy in family matters, courts apply a strict scrutiny analysis that requires both a
compelling state interest as well as a narrowly tailored means-ends fit in order for the regulation
to pass constitutional muster. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) ("Where certain 'funda-
mental rights' are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justi-
fied only by a 'compelling state interest' . . . and that legislative enactments must be narrowly
drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake."); see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374 (1978) (same); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (same).
71. See Developments in the Law, supra note 58, at 1353-54 ("The parental right of control
also serves the child's interests because parents typically possess a sensitivity to the child's person-
ality and needs that the state cannot match, and because the closeness of the familial relationship
provides strong assurances that parents will use their special knowledge of the child to act in his
best interests." (emphasis added)); see also Goldstein, supra note 9, at 650 ("[The legal system]
does not have the capacity to deal on an individual basis with the consequences of its decisions or
to act with the deliberate speed required by a child's sense of time and essential to his well be-
ing."); Horwitz, supra note 9, at 280 ("Parents have both a common law right and a duty to act
as proxies for their children . . . . Parents are given these proxy rights because society views them
as more capable of making reasoned choices for children than the children themselves.").
72. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
73. There are many different values and approaches that individuals bring to the task of
parenting. Accordingly, inherent in the right to family privacy is the concept that there is no one
"right" way to raise children. As such, parents are and must be given latitude as they raise their
children. Note, Mental Hospitalization of Children and the Limits on Parental Authority, 88
YALE L.J. 186, 198-202 (1978); see also Goldstein, supra note 9, at 648-51 ("The law presumes
the capacity and recognizes the authority of adults to parent their children in accord with their
own individual beliefs, preferences, and lifestyles . . . [and not with] some particular religious or
scientific ideal."); Sher, supra note 55, at 170-76 (discussing the basis of parents' fundamental
interest in raising their children); Developments in the Law, supra note 58, at 1214 ("No societal
consensus exists as to the best way to raise children; even if such a consensus existed, however, the
state's parens patriae interest in protecting the well-being of children would still compel a pre-
sumption that parents are better qualified than the state to promote the child's best interests.").
74. Parham, 442 U.S. at 602. The Parham Court explicitly referred to this concept as a legal
presumption. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. (citing I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *447; 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES
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As a result of confidence in the nurturing character that parents bring to the
task of raising their children, parents are afforded broad discretion in the deci-
sions they make for their offspring. 7 This latitude not only guarantees the
right to family privacy but also helps to maintain stability in the home
environment.
While the parents enjoy substantial freedom in this regard, there are limits
to parental authority. 8 Unfortunately, not all parents consistently act in the
best interests of their children. There are times when some parents, by virtue
of their beliefs or inadequacies, act in ways that can and do compromise the
health and welfare of their children. One example can be found in the context
of Jehovah's Witnesses.7 9 Due to their religious beliefs, people who practice
ON AMERICAN LAW *198).
77. This broad discretion is not absolute. For example, parents do not have the discretion to
abuse and neglect their children. This discretion, however, recognizes that parents make mistakes
as well as subject their children to risks. The question then becomes where the discretionary privi-
lege should end and the supervision of parental authority should begin. The author does not pro-
fess to know the answer to this question, but, out of respect for the fundamental right of family
privacy, he believes it necessary to err on the side of parental discretion. See generally Judith
Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the State's Role in Child Neg-
lect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEo. L.J. 887 (1975) (discussing the competing interests of the child,
the parents, and the state in the context of neglect cases); Douglas J. Besharov, "Doing Some-
thing" About Child Abuse: The Need To Narrow the Grounds for State Intervention, 8 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 539 (1985) (discussing state intervention in child abuse cases); Goldstein,
supra note 9, at 619 (exploring the modes of protecting children and parents from excessive state
intervention in abuse cases),
78. Parham, 442 U.S. at 603 ("Nonetheless, we have recognized that a state is not without
constitutional control over parental discretion in dealing with children when their physical or
mental health is jeopardized.").
79. See Washington v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967) (finding the
child neglected due to parents' refusal to allow life-saving medical treatment), affd per curiam,
390 U.S. 598 (1968); People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d 769 (III. 1952) (terminating
parental consent rights after parents refused to allow child to undergo necessary blood transfu-
sions), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952); Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952)
(holding that a child was neglected when the parents refused to consent to a life-saving blood
transfusion on religious grounds); State v. Perricone, 181 A.2d 751 (N.J. 1962) (finding that a
special guardian should be appointed for a child when the parents refused to consent to a blood
transfusion for the child because of religious beliefs),,cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962); Applica-
tion of Brooklyn Hosp., 258 N.Y.S.2d 621 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (ruling that parents' right to consent
to medical treatment should be removed when parents do not consent to life-saving treatment).
The reasoning behind these holdings has been eloquently expressed in Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158 (1944), a case involving a Jehovah's Witness who violated the child labor laws by
allowing her young niece to distribute religious pamphlets. "Parents may be free to become mar-
tyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are free in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of
their children before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make
that choice for themselves." Id. at 170. Parents' consent, or lack thereof, also has been overridden
in cases where they chose unorthodox medical treatment over accepted medical practices for their
children. See, e.g.. Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (Mass. 1978) (overriding the parents'
refusal to treat an otherwise fatal form of leukemia with chemotherapy). But see In re Hofbauer,
393 N.E.2d 1009 (N.Y. 1979) (holding that parents acted reasonably when rejecting the recom-
mendation of chemotherapy treatment because they placed the child under the care of a licensed
physician who advocated metabolic therapy).
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this faith cannot accept blood transfusions. As a result, these parents will not
consent to certain medical procedures, even when the procedure is necessary to
save the life of their child. Courts have consistently overridden the parents'
religious objections in these cases on the ground that life, not premature,
avoidable death, is in the child's best interest."0
There are other examples that may involve conflict of interest or gross disre-
gard for the basic necessities of life, such as food, clothing, shelter, and educa-
tion. In these situations, courts have abridged the right to family privacy and
allowed the state-the other actor with vested interests-to intervene and pro-
tect the child." It must be stressed, however, that the fact "[tihat some par-
ents may at times be acting against the interests of their children . . . creates
a basis for caution, [but it] is hardly a reason to discard wholesale those pages
of human experience that teach that parents generally do act in the child's
best interest."82 This statement reaffirms the notion that parents have a funda-
mental right to direct the upbringing of their children. The following section
demonstrates, however, that in those situations where parents compromise the
health and welfare of their children, it is the state that asserts its power and
assumes the role of parent.
3. The State
The state has several identifiable interests that arise in matters regarding
the medical treatment decisions for children. First and foremost, the state has
a strong interest in the preservation of human life.8 3 A clear example of this
policy can be found in the statutes that criminalize murder and assisted sui-
cide.8 4 As a result, whenever the actions of an individual threaten this essential
value, the state is permitted to intervene and protect its compelling interest in
the sanctity of human life. Recently, however, the United States Supreme
Court recognized that the state's interest in preserving life can be subordi-
80. Parham, 442 U.S. at 602, 603.
81. See id. at 603; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 166 (1944). For a general discussion on state intervention on grounds of child neglect,
see Areen, supra note 77, at 887; Mary S. Coleman, Standards for the Termination of Parental
Rights, 26 WAYNE L. REV. 315 (1980); Sanford N. Katz et al., Child Neglect Laws in America, 9
FAM. L.Q. 1 (1975); Orman Ketcham & Richard F. Babcock, Jr., Statutory Standards for the
Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 530 (1976); Michael S. Wald,
State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standards for Removal of Children from
Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of Parental
Rights. 28 STAN. L. REv. 623 (1976).
82. Parham, 442 U.S. at 603.
83. See In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 300 (III. 1989) ("Illinois has a strong
public policy of preserving the sanctity of human life. ... ); Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen.
Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691 (Ill. 1987) (stating that Illinois has an interest in preserving even imper-
fect life); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (Mass.
1977) (recognizing that the most significant state interest is in human life).
84. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/, para. 752(f) (Supp. 1991) (proscribing mercy killing);.ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1 (Supp. 1991) (proscribing murder); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-32
(Supp. 1991) (proscribing inducement to commit suicide).
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nated to the free exercise of a competent individual's right to bodily integrity
and self-determination, at least in the context of refusing life-sustaining medi-
cal treatment.85 This holding expressly does not apply to incompetent individu-
als for whom clear and convincing evidence of their intent has not been
demonstrated, including minors." In this situation, the state's interests in pre-
serving life remains intact and is buttressed by an additional state interest that
arises in the context of incompetent individuals.
The state also has an important interest in protecting innocent parties who
are unable to protect themselves. 87 This group includes all incompetent indi-
viduals, the mentally infirm, and minors.88 Children are unique because they
rarely possess, by virtue of their inexperience, the ability to protect themselves
from harm.8 Accordingly, when their welfare is compromised by those en-
trusted with the responsibility for their care, the state has the power, as parens
85. Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990). As a result of an automobile
accident, Nancy Cruzan, twenty-six years old at the time, suffered severe injuries and lapsed into
a persistent vegetative state. After it was determined that Nancy would not regain her cognitive
faculties, her parents, as guardians, sought a court order to remove the artificial nutrition and
hydration that were keeping her alive. The Supreme Court of Missouri denied the request, holding
that, absent clear and convincing evidence of Nancy's wishes concerning life-sustaining treatment,
her parents did not have the authority to consent to the withdrawal. Id. at 2846.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision. Id. at 2856. Initially, the Court que-
ried whether an individual had the right to refuse treatment, even where the treatment was neces-
sary to preserve the life of the individual. Answering in the affirmative, the Court noted that this
right was a "logical corollary" of the doctrine of informed consent. Id. at 2847. Specifically, the
Court found that the right to consent to treatment included the right to refuse treatment, and this
right was grounded in principles of self-determination. In addition, the Court reviewed a litany of
case law addressing "termination of treatment" issues and found that the right to refuse treatment
was guaranteed to both competent and incompetent individuals. Id. at 2847-51. However, because
incompetent individuals are unable to give or withhold the requisite consent, the question re-
mained as to when and under what circumstance the previously expressed or implied desires of
these individuals could be given legal weight.
In resolving this dilemma, the Court endorsed the doctrine of substituted judgment as a vehicle
through which the rights of incompetent individuals could be respected. Before this doctrine could
be invoked, however, the Court held that the state may require the standard of clear and convinc-
ing evidence for persons seeking to refuse or terminate treatment on behalf of an incompetent
individual. In support of its holding, the Court cited several state interests, including the preserva-
tion of life, the protection of individuals unable to act on their own behalf, the prevention of
suicide, and* preserving the integrity of the medical profession, which justified imposition of the
higher evidentiary standard. The Court, reviewing the testimony presented at trial, held that the
lower court did not err in concluding this standard was not satisfied. Id. at 2855.
86. Id. at 2855.
87. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (discussing the state's partial
power over minors); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (discussing the state's interest
in protecting the welfare of children); Longeway, 549 N.E.2d at 301 (holding that the state has an
interest in protecting incompetents); Siemieniec, 512 N.E.2d at 691 (explaining the government's
interest in protecting children); Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 426 (discussing the state's interest in
protecting children from the potentially harmful decisions of their parents).
88. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 426.
89. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) (stating that children are unable to make sound
judgments about their health).
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patriae,90 to intervene on behalf of the child.9" This doctrine permits the state
to usurp the role of the parent in these situations.9 2 This, however, should not
be the state's prerogative; it should be the state's duty. 3
There are two other state interests stemming from its role as the guardian of
the health and welfare of society at large. First, there is the goal of ensuring
that society will continue to be productive and self-perpetuating. 94 "A demo-
cratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth
of young people into full maturity as citizens, with all that implies. '95 The
state is entitled to take the necessary steps to attain this goal by insuring that
its children are free from harm. This will enable future adults both to contrib-
ute to society and to help it thrive. Another interest centers around the effi-
cient allocation of limited societal resources.99 By preserving the health and
welfare of minors, the state can prevent these children from becoming its
wards, a process that drains precious dollars from the budget which could be
put to other more productive uses.97 A viable and functioning economy, then,
is a permissible goal for the state to pursue because it preserves the interests of
the entire society.
The final state interest that arises in the context of medical treatment deci-
sions for minors is found in the need to protect the ethical integrity of the
medical profession. 98 While the medical profession can and should be viewed
90. Parens patriae refers to the power of the state to act as a parent for those individuals
suffering under legal disability. See George B. Curtis, The Checkered Career of Parens Patriae:
The State as Parent or Tyrant?, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 895 (1976); Lawrence B. Custer, The Ori-
gins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY L.J. 195 (1978); Daniel B. Griffith, The Best
Interests Standard: A Comparison of the State's Parens Patriae Authority and Judicial Oversight
in Best Interests Determinations for Children and Incompetent Patients, 7 IssuEs L. & MED. 283
(1991); Susan B. Hershkowitz, Due Process and the Termination of Parental Rights, 19 FAM.
L.Q. 245 (1988).
91. Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (Mass. 1978). "On a proper showing that parental
conduct threatens a child's well-being, the interests of the State and of the individual child may
mandate intervention." Id. at 1063.
92. Curtis, supra note 90, at 895 (delineating those circumstances when the state is allowed to
intervene on behalf of the child).
93. Horwitz, supra note 9, at 282-83. One court framed the nature of the state's responsibility
as follows:
The child is a citizen of the State. While he "belongs" to his parents, he belongs
also to his State. Their rights in him entail many duties. Likewise the fact [that] the
child belongs to the State imposes upon the State many duties. Chief among them is
the duty to protect his right to live and to grow up with a sound mind in a sound
body, and to brook no interference with that right by any person or organization.
In re Clark, 185 N.E.2d 128, 132 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1962). But see DeShaney v. Winnebago County,
489 U.S. 189 (1988) (holding that the state possesses no affirmative duty under the Federal Con-
stitution to protect individuals from harm).
94. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944).
95. Id.
96. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 605 (1979) (asserting that the state has an interest in giving
free health care only to those with a genuine need).
97. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 394 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring).
98. See Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 (Mass.
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as a separate actor with values and interests of its own, the state also shares
these interests and is an effective vehicle through which they can be asserted.
When parents make or refuse to make treatment decisions that contravene the
established ethical principles of the medical profession, the state can take steps
to insure that those values are not jeopardized. The success of the medical
profession depends on maintaining the public's confidence that physicians will
conduct themselves pursuant to those established principles. Allowing parents
to abridge these professional interests could destroy the crucial trust inherent
in the patient-physician relationship and, as a result, undermine the function-
ing of the profession. Because the physician plays a critical role in preserving
society's health and welfare, the state has an important interest in protecting
the integrity of that role.
The primary vehicles through which the state asserts its parens patriae
power for the benefit of minors are child abuse and neglect statutes.9 All
states have this type of legislation, which authorizes intervention by the state
upon a finding that the child has suffered from abuse or neglect.' 00 In the
context of medical treatment, the Illinois legislature defines a neglected child
as one whose parents have failed to provide the child with any and all treat-
ment necessary to that child's well-being.10' Once this finding is made, the
court can appoint a guardian to represent the legal interests of the child. 02
Once appointed, the guardian is entrusted to determine the course of action
that best serves the child's interests, and is empowered to make the decisions
necessary to achieve this result.
It should be noted that a finding of neglect will not issue in all situations
where parents opt to withhold medical treatment. 0 3 There is debate as to
whether the courts should intervene when the child's life is not threatened by
parental inaction.' 04 There are also cases involving parents who refuse to con-
1977).
99. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 802-3 (1989).
100. E.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-406 (1991); N.J. REV. STAT. § 9:6-3 (Supp. 1991); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.31 (Anderson 1990).
101. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 802-3.
102. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 100 t/, para. 11-5 (Supp. 1991); see infra notes 111-24 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the procedures and standards used for appointing guardians).
103. One of the most interesting and controversial examples of this point is in the area of
withholding treatment from defective newborns. For a thorough discussion of the issues involved,
see RICHARD C. SPARKS. BIOETHICS AND THE HANDICAPPED NEWBORN (1988); ROBERT WEIR,
SELECTIVE NONTREATMENT OF HANDICAPPED NEWBORNS (1984); ETHICAL ISSUES AT THE OUT-
SET OF LIFE (William B. Weil & Martin Benjamin eds., 1987); Larry Gostin, A Moment in
Human Development: Legal Protection. Ethical Standards and Social Policy in the Selective
Non-Treatment of Handicapped Neonates, II AM. J.L. & MED. 31 (1985).
104. Compare, e.g., In re Seiferth, 127 N.E.2d 80 (N.Y. 1955) (refusing to intervene and order
surgical repair of child's cleft palate and harelip) and In re Green, 292 A.2d 387 (Pa. 1972)
(refusing to intervene and order surgery for a chile, who suffered from a severe form of scoliosis)
and In re Hudson, 126 P.2d 765 (Wash. 1942) (refusing to intervene and order the surgical
removal of a deformed arm) with In re Kawarth, 199 N.W.2d 147 (Iowa 1972) (ordering surgical
removal of tonsils over parents' objection) and In re Sampson, 278 N.E.2d (N.Y. 1972) (ordering
plastic surgery over mother's religious objections).
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sent to medical treatment on religious grounds." 5 In these situations, a tension
exists between the state's interest in the welfare of the child and the parent's
right to freedom of religion as guaranteed by the First Amendment. 106 Also,
where the refusal to consent is based on accepted medical advice, as is the case
with severely defective newborns and dying children with no hope of any
meaningful recovery, the courts will not find the child neglected.1 0 7 By con-
trast, there may be situations in which the parents consent to a particular
treatment, but the courts override this consent because the treatment is not in
the child's best interest.10 8 This is most common where the chosen therapy is
intended to benefit a third party, such as situations involving experimental
treatment and organ donation.109 While the state enjoys a vested interest in
safeguarding the health and welfare of minors, the contours of this interest
undergo consistent development on a case-by-case basis. Unique situations do
arise, and the nature of the competing interests can only be determined with
reference to those particular circumstances.
E. The Role of the Courts
When disputes arise over medical treatment decisions for minors, either be-
tween the state and the parents or among the parents themselves, the courts
are often called upon to resolve these conflicts. This is not an enviable task.
The endeavor requires the sensitive balancing of competing interests, and often
no clear-cut answers are available. Compounding the difficulties inherent in
this process are the urgency of the proceedings and the tragic reality surround-
ing the case of a sick or dying child. In resolving these disputes, while consid-
ering all competing interests, the courts must focus primarily on the minor's
interests.110 After all, the minor is the person who is most affected by the
outcome of the proceeding.
Two elements in this judicial process are worthy of mention. The first con-
cerns the appointment and role of the surrogate decision-maker/guardian and
105. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (discussing cases involving Jehovah's Witnesses
who refuse to accept blood transfusions).
106. U.S. CONST. amend I. Specifically, it is the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
that is implicated in these situations.
107. See Soloveichik v. Soloveichik, No. 89 CH 215, slip op. at 3 (I1. Cir. Ct. Jan. 19, 1989).
108. See In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185 (La. 1973) (denying the parents' request that one of
* their children be allowed to donate his kidney for the benefit of his sister); Charles H. Baron, Live
Organ and Tissue Transplants from Minor Donors in Massachusetts, 55 B.U. L. REV. 159 (1975)
(discussing the legal problem of parental consent for minors who wish to donate their organs);
William J. Curran, A Problem of Consent: Kidney Transplantation in Minors, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV.
891 (1959) (discussing briefly three Massachusetts cases that required the consent of minor organ
donors to be obtained prior to the procedure).
109. In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d at 187.
110. Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1063 (Mass. 1979) (discussing the paramount
importance of the minor's interests); Robert Bennett, Allocation of Child Medical Care Decision-
Making Authority: A Suggested Interest Analysis, 62 VA. L. REv. 285, 307-08 (1976); Miller,
supra note 9, at 838.
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the guardian ad litem." 1 These individuals can play distinct roles, and it is the
latter person who assumes greater importance in disputes over medical treat-
ment decisions."' The second consideration involves the appropriate standard
of analysis to be employed by the court in resolving the dispute. There are two
approaches commonly used to-make medical decisions for legally incompetent
individuals: the substituted judgment doctrine and the best interests test. "'
Each of these standards is appropriate in certain defined sets of circumstances.
This section examines both of these considerations as they pertain to judicial
resolution of disputes over medical treatment decisions.
1. The Surrogate Parent and the Guardian ad Litem
A third party can play two different roles when representing the interests of
a minor. One role is the surrogate parent or, in the alternative, the general
guardian. This person is charged with the "general care and control of the
person and estate of the ward.""" As the definition implies, there is a sense of
permanency in the position, and the general guardian, in the case of incompe-
tent minors, assumes a parental role. As such, the general guardian is en-
trusted with all the rights and duties possessed by a natural parent, including
the right to grant or withhold consent for medical treatment."' This relation-
ship usually lasts until the minor reaches the age of majority or attains an
emancipated status." 6
The courts have the authority to appoint a general guardian in a variety of
circumstances. The Illinois Probate Act, for example, specifies that the court
can create this relationship on its own motion, on the motion of a reputable
citizen, or "whenever it appears necessary or convenient.""17 This power en-
compasses the situation in which a child is found to be abused or neglected
and can extend to cases where a conflict of interest exists between parent and
child. Since the guardian assumes the role of parent when the child is a minor,
custody is usually granted to the general guardian. " " While guardians serve
11. For the purposes of this Comment, the surrogate decision-maker and guardian ad litem
are different actors. It should be noted that a licensed attorney, appointed as guardian ad litem,
can serve in both of these capacities. See infra notes 114-24 and accompanying text (discussing
various forms of surrogate decision-making).
112. The reason behind this conclusion is that the guardian ad litem is the person who repre-
sents the child in judicial proceedings. It is in these proceedings that best interests and substituted
judgment determinations are made.
113. See infra sections l.E.2.b and l.E.2.c, notes 139-65 and accompanying text (discussing and
analyzing, in turn, the substituted judgment doctrine and the best interests test).
114. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 706 (6th ed. 1990).
115. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10 th, para. 11-13 (1989).
116. Once the minor attains the age of majority, the policy justification underlying the guardi-
anship disappears. The individual is now presumed to be able to take care of himself or herself
and, as such, needs no additional supervision. It should be noted that a showing of parental fitness
can also result in the restoration of parental custody. Id. para. 11-5(d).
117. Id. para. 11-5(a).
118. Id. para. 11-13(a).
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an essential function in our society by preserving the welfare of incompetent
individuals, guardians do not play a role in the disputes between parents over
medical treatment decisions unless, through prior court appointment, the
guardian himself or herself is a party to the dispute.
The other type of guardian whose role is critical in these disputes is the
guardian ad litem." 9 Unlike the general guardian, the guardian ad litem is a
special guardian who possesses limited powers and duties with respect to the
child.'20 The primary function served by this person can best be described as a
legal representative for the child who has the responsibility to both advocate
and safeguard the interests of the child during legal proceedings.' 2' This not
only includes situations in which the minor is a party to the suit, but also
where the child's interests are the subject of the proceedings. In most cases,
the guardian ad litem is an attorney who directly represents the child in court.
In the event this person is not an attorney, he or she is directly responsible for
obtaining counsel to serve in this capacity.122 Moreover, when a child is in-
volved in the proceedings, the court has a duty to insure the appointment of a
guardian ad litem. By serving as the minor's voice, the guardian ad litem has
the opportunity to prevent the subordination of the minor's interest to those of
the other parties involved.12 3
It is important to reemphasize the need for a guardian ad litem when deal-
ing with disputed medical treatment decisions. These decisions directly affect
the health and welfare of the child, especially when made in life-and-death
situations. While the court may find that one of the parties to the dispute-the
parent(s) or the state-is acting consistently with the child's best interests,
this is not always the case.12  For example, while parents may disagree over a
treatment decision, the dispute may actually be the byproduct of other marital
tensions. In addition, the stress, depression, and anger that inevitably accom-
119. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch 37, para. 802-17 (1989).
120. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 706 (6th ed. 1990) ("A guardian ad litem is a special guard-
ian appointed by the court to prosecute or defend, in behalf of an infant or incompetent, a suit to
which he is a party, and such guardian is considered an officer of the court to represent the
interests of the infant or incompetent in the litigation.").
121. Robin v. Robin, 359 N.E.2d 809, 815 (Ill. 1977) (stating that the role of guardian ad
litem is to represent the minor in any proceedings to which the child is a party); Roth v. Roth, 367
N.E.2d 442, 447 (111. 1977) (determining that the court has the duty to appoint a guardian ad
litem to protect the interests and welfare of the minor when that minor does not have
representation).
122. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 802-17(4).
123. See id. para. 801-2 (discussing the purpose and policy provisions of the statute).
124. For example, if the choice is between performing surgery or not performing surgery and
the parents disagree, it is clear that, whichever avenue is deemed to be in the child's best interests,
one of the parent's wishes will be consistent with that finding. Although one of the parents' re-
quests is in the child's best interests, this does not mean that the child should not have the benefit
of legal representation. At the least, the guardian ad litem can help the court in making the best
interests determination. Moreover, if neither of the parents are requesting a course of action con-
sistent with the child's best interests, the guardian ad litem can help to uncover this fact. Because
there is potential for conflict of interest in these proceedings, the guardian ad litem is indispensa-
ble to safeguard the child's best interests.
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pany tragedy can cloud the judgment of even the most caring and responsible
parents. The state, on the other hand, may be underinformed. This is possible
considering the overburdened and underfinanced condition of most social ser-
vice agencies. In light of these realities, the guardian ad litem can provide the
court with objective facts that can only serve to guide the court in making a
well-informed decision. The following section explores the two standards used
in making decisions for incompetent individuals.
2. Standards of Review
a. The right to bodily integrity and self-determination
As long ago as 1891, the United States Supreme Court recognized the right
of all citizens to bodily integrity and self-determination.2 "No right is held
more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right
of every individual to the possession and control of his own person free from
all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable au-
thority of law." '26 This right is also embodied in the constitutional right of
privacy that recognizes a zone in which people are free from unwarranted in-
trusion in the exercise of their guaranteed freedoms. 127 Included in this zone of
privacy is the right to decide what one can or cannot do with his or her own
body. The Illinois constitution expressly recognizes this right to bodily integ-
rity and self-determination. 28
Implicit in this right of personal inviolability is the concept of informed con-
sent.1 29 In the words of Justice Cardozo, "Every human being of adult years
and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own
body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent
125. Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). Self-determination also can be
defined as personal autonomy. These two terms are used interchangeably for the purposes of this
Comment. See also Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Pub. Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2846 (1990)
(observing the Court's past recognition of the right of "possession and control of his own person,
free from all restraint or interference of others"); In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 297
(11. 1989) (same).
126. Botsford, 141 U.S. at 251.
127. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, the first in a series of cases
charting the contours of the fundamental right to privacy, the Court held that a Connecticut
statute banning the dissemination of birth control information was unconstitutional. The Court
held that freedom in matters involving procreation was implicit in the concept of ordered liberty
and, as such, there could be no state intrusion into this zone of privacy absent a compelling inter-
est. Id. at 485; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing the right to seek an
abortion as inherent in the right to privacy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (recogniz-
ing that the right of privacy extends to married and unmarried persons alike); In re Estate of
Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 296 (11. 1989) (reiterating a constitutional right to privacy as guar-
anteed by the penumbra of the Bill of Rights); Family Life League v. Department of Public Aid,
493 N.E.2d 1054 (Il1. 1986) (same).
128. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("The people shall have the right to be secure in their persons . ..
against . . . invasions of privacy .... ").
129. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2846-47 (stating that consent is required to maintain the right of
personal inviolability); Longeway, 549 N.E.2d at 297 (same).
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commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages." ' 80 Informed consent is
therefore required before any medical procedure can be performed, barring
certain limited exceptions."'1 This principle requires the physician to divulge
any and all information to the patient that is necessary to make an informed
and intelligent treatment decision. 32 This not only includes the benefits and
risks of the proposed course of therapy, but also any reasonable and available
treatment alternatives.' 33 As a result, informed consent directly empowers the
individual to control his or her own destiny and, in doing so, preserves the
right of bodily integrity and self-determination.
The above-quoted passage from Justice Cardozo, however, signals that there
are limitations to the doctrine of informed consent. By specifying "adult years
and sound mind," he recognized that both minors and the mentally infirm are
not capable of exercising this right. This does not mean these individuals do
not possess protected interests.'" Rather, this implies that someone other than
the incompetent individual must assert this right in order for consent to be
valid.' s35
There are two standards by which courts make decisions for incompetent
individuals: the substituted judgment doctrine and the best interests test. 1 6
While these approaches are quite different, they embody the common goal of
130. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
131. In re Estate of Brooks, 205 N.E.2d 435 (I11. 965) (requiring informed consent for all
medical care); Pratt v. Davis, 79 N.E. 562 (I11. 906) (same).
132. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). See
generally RUTH FADEN ET AL.. A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT (1986) (discuss-
ing the origin and nature of informed consent); JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND
PATIENT (1984) (discussing informed consent and the relationship between doctors and patients);
ARNOLD ROSOFF. INFORMED CONSENT (1981) (discussing the doctrine of informed consent); FAY
ROZOVSKY. CONSENT TO TREATMENT (2d ed. 1990) (reviewing the role of consent in various con-
texts); Theordore R. LeBlang, Informed Consent-Duty and Causation: A Survey of Current
Developments, 18 FORUM 280 (1983) (discussing current developments of standards regarding
informed consent); Alan Meisel, The "'Exceptions" to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a
Balance Between Competing Values in Medical Decision Making, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 413 (dis-
cussing the allocation of authority between doctor and patient); Jon R. Waltz & Thomas W.
Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U. L. REV. 628 (1970) (establishing a sys-
tematic approach to the resolution of informed consent problems).
133. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 772.
134. Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Pub. Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2848 (1990) (citing In re
Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229-33 (N.J. 1985)); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v.
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 427, 431, 434 (Mass. 1977).
135. Saikewicz. 370 N.E.2d at 431.
136. For thorough discussions of the substituted judgment doctrine and the best interests test,
see Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Pub. Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990); Curran v. Bosze, 566
N.E.2d 1319 (III. 1990); In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292 (111. 989); Superintendent of
Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977); Louise Harman, Falling Off
the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1 (1990); John
A. Robertson, Organ Donations by Incompetents and the Substituted Judgment Doctrine, 76
COLUM. L. REV. 48 (1976); Walter M. Weber, Substituted Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analy-
sis, I ISSUjES L. & MED. 131 (1985); Horwitz, supra note 9, at 271; Miller, supra note 9, at 827
(1989).
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helping a court decide for those who cannot decide for themselves. The man-
ner in which this process is effected, however, is where these approaches part
company. While both doctrines preserve the individual's right to bodily integ-
rity, only the substituted judgment doctrine furthers the right to self-determi-
nation. 87 Thus, this approach is preferred. There are situations in which sub-
stituted judgment is not applicable and, therefore, a court fashions its decision
based on the best interests of the individual. In Curran, each parent argued for
the use of a different standard.138 While it is not clear that the choice of either
approach would be outcome-determinative, in this case it is certainly possible.
As a result, it is essential to determine which standard applies in any given set
of circumstances. To this end, a discussion of each standard follows.
b. The substituted judgment doctrine
When a court is faced with making decisions for incompetent individuals,
one available route to achieve this end is the substituted judgment doctrine.
This principle allows the court to make choices for the incompetent by deter-
mining what the individual would have chosen had he or she been competent
to do so at the time of the decision.139 Although this doctrine originated in a
case involving an allowance petition from the estate of a mental incompe-
tent,"140 it is now commonly used in the medical treatment context, usually
where termination of treatment is at issue. 4" When this doctrine is applied, it
allows the court to give a voice to the individual, who, by virtue of his or her
incompetence, can no longer articulate a preference in a legally cognizable
fashion." 2
Underlying the substituted judgment doctrine is respect for the incompetent
individual's right to self-determination. 4  Accordingly, the loss of the ability
to choose for oneself no longer involves the loss of rights guaranteed to all
other citizens.144 This principle, then, protects an incompetent's right to bodily
137. See infra section l.E.2.b (discussing the principles behind the substituted judgment
doctrine).
138. Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1322.
139. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2847; Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1323; In re Estate of Greenspan, 558
N.E.2d 1194 (I11. 1990); Longeway, 549 N.E.2d at 299-300; Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp.,
497 N.E.2d 626, 631-32 (Mass. 1986); Saikewicz, :370 N.E.2d at 431; In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434,
444-47 (N.J. 1987); In re O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1988); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64
(N.Y.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 744-45 (Wash. 1983).
140. See Ex parte Whitbred, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (1816).
141. Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1322; Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 431.
142. See, e.g., Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1322; Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 431.
143. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2848 ("[Tjhe right of self-determination should not be lost merely
because an individual is unable to sense a violation of it."); see also Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 427
(recognizing that incompetent persons have the stme rights as competent persons "because the
value of human dignity extends to both").
144. See Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2848; see also In re Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 51
(Mass. 1981) ("To deny [this right] to persons who are incapable of exercising it personally is to
degrade those whose disabilities make them wholly reliant on other, more fortunate,
individuals.").
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integrity and self-determination by giving effect to that which this person
would actually have chosen in a given set of circumstances. ' 5 Thus, it is not
really the court that is making the decision. Rather, it is the incompetent indi-
vidual who decides. 14 6
There are two ways in which the court can employ the substituted judgment
doctrine to arrive at the decision the incompetent individual would have made.
The first is narrow in scope and is known as the subjective standard.'47 Using
this approach, the court will look to the clearly expressed intent of the individ-
ual regarding the medical treatment at issue. 48 For example, in the termina-
tion-of-treatment context, a living will or power of attorney for health care can
provide this evidence." 9 These documents explicitly delineate the individual's
wishes in certain defined circumstances. Specific oral communications also sat-
isfy the subjective standard.
The second method that is followed by a number of jurisdictions, including
Illinois, is the limited-objective standard.' 50 These courts will permit the use of
substituted judgment in cases lacking a clear expression of intent by the in-
competent individual. 15' In employing this standard, the court will look to
other trustworthy evidence that helps to paint a picture of the individual's
personal value system, " 'including his or her philosophical, religious, and
145. See cases cited supra note 139 (discussing the judiciary's role in consent decisions for
incompetent individuals).
146. In re Moe, 432 N.E.2d 712, 720 (Mass. 1982) ("The court dons the 'mental mantle of the
incompetent' and substitutes itself as nearly as possible for the individual in the decision making
process.").
147. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2848.
148. Id.
149. A living will enables an individual to declare in writing the precise form or forms of medi-
cal treatment that will be administered or withheld in the event the individual is no longer able to
participate in his or her own health care decisions. See, e.g., Illinois Living Will Act, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110 /, para. 701 (Supp. 1991). A power of attorney for health care, on the other hand,
enables the individual to delegate decision-making authority to an agent who, in the exercise of
this authority, acts in conformity with the individual's values and expressed preference. See, e.g.,
Illinois Powers of Attorney for Health Care Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 /2, para. 804 (Supp.
1991). It should be noted, however, that the power of attorney for health care supersedes the
operation of a living will as long as the designated agent is available to make the necessary health
care decisions. Id. para. 804-11. Additionally, Illinois has recently enacted a new statute dealing
with surrogate decision-making in the health care context. Illinois Health Care Surrogate Act,
P.A. No. 87-749 (1991). The Act's express purpose is to "define the circumstances under which
private decisions by patients with decisional capacity and by surrogate decision makers on behalf
of patients lacking decisional capacity to terminate life-sustaining treatment may be made without
judicial involvement of any kind." Id. While this act is without force in situations covered by a
valid living will or power of health-care attorney, it nevertheless fills the gaps left by those docu-
ments, which may be otherwise limited or nonexistent.
150. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2849; In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 299 (II1. 1989);
see also In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1231-33 (N.J. 1988) (permitting evidence indicating that
an incompetent patient would have forgone medical treatment). But see In re Westchester County
Medical Ctr. ex rel. O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1988) (requiring clear and convincing
evidence of an individual's intent).
151. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2849.
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moral views, life goals, values about the purpose of life and the way it should
be lived, and attitudes toward sickness, medical procedures, suffering and
death.' "152 These factors taken as a whole can guide the judge in ascertaining
what the individual would have done had he or she been competent to decide.
A common thread running through both approaches to the substituted judg-
ment doctrine is the intent of the individual. At all times, the court seeks to
reconstruct this intent in deciding for the incompetent. The doctrine preserves
individual autonomy because it both mandates a search for this intent and
respects this intent once it has been revealed. However, it is not always possi-
ble to determine an individual's intent. Situations exist in which either the
incompetent individual has never been competent or trustworthy evidence is
not available to establish the individual's intent and preferences. This may or
may not be the case in situations involving minors. When these circumstances
do arise, however, the justification for utilizing the substituted judgment doc-
trine collapses, and a different standard is required.
c. The best interests test
The best interests approach is the other method by which courts make treat-
ment decisions for incompetent individuals. " Under this approach, a court
does not determine what the person would have wanted had he or she been
competent to decide. Rather, the court decides for the individual based on
which course of action it believes is in his or her best interest.154 The power to
make such decisions stems from the power of the court to act as parens patriae
for those unable to care or to choose for themselves.'5
The origin of the best interests test can be traced to the resolution of child
custody disputes where courts endeavored to determine which parent could
best serve the child's physical and psychological welfare.' In making such
determinations, the court would look to a variety of objective facts and charac-
152. In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 445 (N.J. 1987) (quoting Steven A. Newman, Treatment Re-
fusals for the Critically Ill: Proposed Rules for he Family, the Physician and the State, 3
N.Y.L. SCH. HuM. RTs. ANN. 35, 45-46 (1985)).
153. See Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674 (Ariz. 1987); In re Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840
(Cal. 1988); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984); In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1987);
In re Hamlin, 689 P.2d 1372 (Wash. 1984).
154. Longeway, 549 N.E.2d at 299 ("Under the best interests test, a surrogate decision maker
chooses for the incompetent patient which medical procedures would be in the patient's best inter-
ests. The criteria used include 'relief from suffering, preservation or restoration of functioning, and
quality and extent of sustained life.'" (quoting Rasmussen, 741 P.2d at 689)); see also Stewart
Pollock, Life and Death Decisions: Who Makes Them and by What Standard?, 41 RUTGERS L.
REV. 505, 520 (1985) ("The best interests test involves consideration of objective facts such as the
patient's age, level of consciousness, condition, and isolation, together with the restrictions on his
or her physical freedom. Also to be considered are the invasiveness of the treatment and the pain,
if any, experienced by the patient.").
155. Pollock, supra note 154, at 521.
156. Id.; see also Ruth Charlow, Awarding Custody: The Best Interests of the Child and Other
Fictions, 5 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 267 (1987) (discussing use of best interests test in child cus-
tody determinations).
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teristics concerning each parent in order to guide its judgment.15 7 Although
this approach is still utilized in the child custody context, it is also used for
making medical treatment decisions for incompetent individuals. In such cir-
cumstances, the court will look to objective criteria to determine whether the
burdens of a proposed course of treatment outweigh the benefits. " Some of
these factors include the patient's age, life expectancy with or without the pro-
cedure, present and future pain and suffering, risks and side effects of the
procedure, and the extent of the patient's disability and helplessness.159 In an
effort to evaluate these factors in an objective manner, the court assumes the
perspective of the reasonable person.160 This helps to insure that the subjective
values and preferences of the parents, relatives, and other surrogate decision-
makers do not enter into the best interests calculus.
Although the substituted judgment doctrine is the preferred standard be-
cause it preserves the incompetent individual's right to personal autonomy, the
best interests test is frequently used in cases involving children. 6 ' Even those
courts that profess to employ substituted judgment for a minor's medical
treatment decisions actually use the best interests standard. 62 In Strunk v.
Strunk, 6 the Kentucky Supreme Court was faced with a petition requesting
that a twenty-seven-year-old lifelong incompetent be allowed to donate bone
marrow to save his dying brother. The court expressly stated that the substi-
tuted judgment doctrine controlled, but the opinion was full of language con-
cerning the balancing of benefits and burdens.' 6' Such language indicates that
the court did not decide on the grounds of the incompetent person's intent, but
rather on which choice would best serve the incompetent's well-being. 6
157. Some of these factors include "maturity and judgment, mental stability, ability to provide
access to schools, moral character, ability to provide continuing involvement in the community,
financial sufficiency, and sense of responsibility for the child." Charlow, supra note 156, at 268.
158. Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 684 (Ariz. 1987).
159. Id.
160. Pollock, supra note 154, at 522.
161. See Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319, 1326 (III. 1990); see also Brief of Guardian ad
Litem for Allison and Jimmy Curran at 26, Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319 (I11. 1990) (No.
70501) ("[N]o rational basis for a substituted judgment decision exists for infants and life-long
incompetents because they have had no opportunity to gain and then express their views on any of
the types of life experiences required, first to form any value judgments and second, for a surro-
gate truly to 'don the[ir] mental mantle.' " (alteration in cited source)).
162. Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1331. The court embarked on a case-by-case analysis of several
opinions regarding organ transplantation from both minors and life-long incompetents to other
people, including siblings, in order to show that these courts have consistently applied a best inter-
ests analysis even where purporting to use the substituted judgment doctrine. See id. at 1326-31
(interpreting Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386 (Conn. 1972); Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky.
1969); In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185 (La. 1973); Little v. Little, 576 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. 1979);
In re Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d 180 (Wis. 1975)).
163. 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969).
164. See id. at 146-48.
165. Id.; see also Pollock, supra note 154, at 525-30. Pollock noticed a trend in courts' deci-
sions to use the label "substituted judgment" when, in reality, the courts were applying a best
interests analysis. Pollock cautions the reader to "look beneath the label." Id. at 525.
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Moreover, this result is reasonable in light of the fact that when the court
assumes the role of parent, it should guide its decision-making process by the
standard to which it 'holds parents, that is, the best interests approach.
In sum, the best interests doctrine applies in cases where the individual has
never been competent or has never adequately expressed his or her intent re-
garding medical treatment decisions. Cases involving children fall into this
category. Although this approach may not directly preserve the incompetent
person's right to self-determination, by requiring an evaluation of objective
criteria it avoids the pitfalls of interjecting the subjective preferences of the
surrogate into the decision-making process. To this extent, the best interests
analysis does not readily permit the result that the substituted judgment doc-
trine was designed to prevent.
II. ANALYSIS
While it is not possible to determine how often disputes arise between par-
ents over the medical treatment decisions for their children, the examples pro-
vided in this Comment indicate that these situations do arise.' 66 In many cases
there are likely to be urgent circumstances that are compounded by the tragic
nature of the situation. Decisions need to be made quickly; however, the deci-
sion-making process is not easy. As shown above, there are several actors in-
volved in these disputes, all of whom have vested interests in the outcome.16
In providing guidance for the resolution of these disputes, this section focuses
on two distinct components of the decision-making process. First, a substantive
approach is used to suggest the proper method for balancing the competing
interests. Second, a procedural approach delineates how these competing inter-
ests, in light of the substantive formula, can best be respected. At all times, it
should be emphasized, the interests of the minor must remain the paramount
concern.
A. The Substantive Approach
As indicated, there are several sets of competing interests implicated in
these types of disputes. The purpose of this section is to suggest a formula
through which these interests can be balanced in order to arrive at the desired
conclusion. Before this formula can be identified, it is appropriate to summa-
rize these various interests. The minor has the right to bodily integrity and, in
certain defined circumstances, the right to self-determination. 168 Because the
166. The author has found only three cases involving disputes between parents over medical
treatment decisions for their children. There may be other such decisions, however, but they are
likely to be unreported. There are two reasons for this conclusion. First, in emergency cases, once
the decision is made, the basis for the dispute disappears and the case becomes moot. Second,
parental differences may be subject to resolution at various points prior to the appeals process.
Hence, the majority of these types of cases may never make it past the trial court.
167. See supra notes 55-109 and accompanying text (analyzing the competing interests of chil-
dren, parents, and the state that factor into decisions over medical treatment).
168. See supra notes 125-38 and accompanying text (discussing the United States Supreme
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minor normally cannot exercise these rights, others are entrusted to perform
this task. First and foremost, the parents are the individuals who possess this
responsibility and, as such, they are entitled to make those decisions that their
child is incapable of making. 169 In doing so, parents have the constitutional
right to be free from state interference. Moreover, this right to family privacy,
as noted by the Jane Doe court, is vested in each individual parent, and not
shared by the parental unit. 70 When parents are delinquent in the exercise of
their right, the state, as parens patriae, is entitled to intervene to preserve the
minor's interests. Typically, the vehicles through which the state assumes the
role of parent are child abuse and neglect statutes. Although these principles
appear reasonably straightforward, parental disagreement distorts their appli-
cation. When this occurs, the central force in the decision-making process is
disabled, and, as a result, a decision-making vacuum is created. Therefore, the
challenge involves defeating this state of inertia and arriving at a decision.
The key to resolving these disputes is twofold. First, the individual who is to
make the decision must be identified. Second, the standard by which the deci-
sion is to be made must be defined. Answering the first question can be accom-
plished through a process of elimination.
Under normal circumstances, parents make medical treatment decisions for
their children. Both parents possess this right and, absent some form of inca-
pacity or contractual relationship to the contrary, one parent is not entitled to
exercise this right to the exclusion of the other.'"" When disagreement pre-
vents parents from acting on behalf of their children, the respective parental
rights must cancel each other out of the balancing equation.'72 There are two
principal reasons for this conclusion. First, while disputes over medical treat-
ment decisions affect parental rights, there is a third party whose interests are
also affected. This individual is the child. Because the focus of the dispute
concerns a medical treatment decision, the child's welfare must be the primary
consideration. When disagreement disables parents' ability to act, this inaction
threatens the child's welfare. As a result, the parents must be written out of
the equation.
Court's recognition of every person's right to bodily integrity and self-determination).
169. See supra notes 65-82 and accompanying text (tracing the traditional right held by par-
ents to make decisions concerning the medical treatment of their minor children).
170. See In re Jane Doe, Civ. No. D-93064, slip op. at 16 (Ga. Sup. Ct. Oct. 17, 1991) (pub-
lished in Fulton County Daily Report, Oct. 18, 1991) (discussing the constitutional premise that
parental rights are apportioned equally between the father and mother).
171. Id.
172. In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716, 722 (Ga. 1984) ("In the case of suspected neglect or abuse
or when the parent assumes a stance which in any way endangers the child, the parent's right to
speak for the child may be lost."); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FORGO
LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 216 (1983) ("When a decision consistent with the child's interests
is not reached, the health care provider should seek to have a court appoint a surrogate in place of
the parents, on the grounds that the parents are incapacitated to make the decision, unable to
agree, unconcerned for the infant's well-being, or acting out of an interest that conflicts with the
child's." (emphasis added)) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION].
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Parental rights are fundamental but not sacrosanct. When parents fail to
provide their children with necessary medical care, their constitutional rights
can be compromised and even terminated.' 73 The source of the parental failure
to provide necessary medical care should not make a difference. The end result
is the same. Thus, whether it is irresponsibility or inaction stemming from
disagreement, the child's welfare is still th:reatened. In order to insure that the
child's interests are protected, the threat must be removed. While stripping
parents of their right to make these decisions is not a desirable solution, it is
the only way to guarantee the preservation of the child's welfare.7 4
The second reason for removing the parents from the balancing equation
can be found in the parental relationship itself. When faced with the reality of
a very sick child, parents may be presented with several treatment options,
including nontreatment. Depending on the parents' respective values, each
might believe a specific treatment regimen is best for the child. However, the
treatment choices can be mutually exclusive. For example, in Soloveichik v.
Soloveichik, one parent wanted additional surgery whereas the other wanted
only palliative care. In these situations, each parent is attempting to do what is
best for the child, and both parents have an equal right to make this decision.
Without addressing the merits of the particular treatment options, it is clear
that a decision needs to be made. If one parent is given the right to make the
decision to the exclusion of the other, the latter's fundamental rights have
been violated. In addition, the integrity of the family unit is likely to be dam-
aged by giving one parent absolute control over the destiny of the child. Re-
moving the parents from the equation treats both parents equally with respect
to their constitutional rights and may serve to provide stability to a strained
family environment.
Under most circumstances, the child who is the subject of the dispute is not
competent, either legally or physically, to make the necessary treatment deci-
sion. For example, in the specific cases discussed earlier in this Comment, two
of the children suffered extended bouts of unconsciousness and were unable to
communicate their wishes. In Curran v. Bosze, the twins were only three and
one-half years old and were clearly unabie to either form or express their in-
tent concerning the bone marrow procedure. This result is likely to be common
in cases involving children who are very sick. As such, a surrogate decision-
maker is required to choose on behalf of these children.
There may, however, be cases in which the child is capable of deciding for
himself or herself. Several states have recognized exceptions to the general
rule that children are not competent to consent for their medical care. These
exceptions are known as the emancipated minor doctrine and the mature mi-
173. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text (noting the latitude parents have in raising
their children but recognizing that certain limits upon parental authority must exist).
174. In light of the procedural analysis that follows this section, this conclusion is not as harsh
as it may appear on its face. By focusing on the process as well, the author has tried to incorpo-
rate safeguards to help preserve parental rights before judicial disposition is required. Ideally,
these steps will be followed and lead to a successful resolution of the dispute.
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nor doctrine. 175 Under these doctrines, there are certain defined situations in
which minors have the right to consent to medical treatment. 17 While a more
extensive discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this Comment, it
should be mentioned that these rules are premised on the idea that, by virtue
of their age and experience, certain adolescent minors may possess the requi-
site maturity and intelligence to make important decisions. 177 These children
are often able to understand the nature and risks of medical treatment and, as
a result of their maturity, are entitled to exercise their autonomy. 78 When the
case involves a mature or emancipated minor, the search for a surrogate deci-
sion-maker should cease. At this point, the minor's decision regarding the pro-
posed treatment options should be the final word on the matter.
As indicated, when parents are derelict in their duties, the state, as parens
patriae, has the right and responsibility to intervene and protect the child.'7 9
Inherent in the state's authority to take control of the child is the power to
make decisions on behalf of the child. Although the state has a vested interest
in the health and welfare of its children, it is not the most desirable surrogate
to make difficult medical treatment decisions. These decisions not only involve
complex medical issues but also may raise unique and significant ethical con-
siderations. As a result, these cases require individualized attention over an
extended period of time. 80 While the state may be adept at providing basic
services for abused and neglected minors, such as removing them to welfare
facilities or foster homes, it is ill-equipped to serve as a parent for the purpose
of medical treatment decision-making. Social service agencies are generally
175. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, paras. 2201-2211 (1989). See generally Bennett, supra note 9,
at 288-94 (discussing the mature minor doctrine and several other exceptions to the common law
general rule mandating parental consent); Ewald, supra note 9, at 700-05 (tracing the minor's
role in medical decision-making in the context of specific treatment, emancipation, maturity, and
judicial intervention).
176. These situations may be divided into a number of categories. First, there are certain medi-
cal conditions for which minors can consent to treatment, including venereal disease, substance
abuse, and pregnancy. Ewald, supra note 9, at 701. Second, certain statutes may prescribe an age
at which minors can consent. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-1-402(a) (1991) (high school
graduate); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.640 (1989) (fifteen or older); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10101
(1977) (high school graduate). Third, there are certain characteristics, such as marriage, living
away from home, financial independence, and military service, that qualify the minor as emanci-
pated. In these situations, the minor may consent. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE ANN. § 62 (Deering
Supp. 1982). Finally, certain statutes authorize any minor who can prove the requisite maturity
and intelligence to make his or her own health care decisions. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-
3(h) (1981) (requiring that minor be of "sufficient intelligence to understand and appreciate the
consequences of the proposed surgical or medical treatment or procedures, for himself").
177. Ewald, supra note 9, at 701, 703.
178. Id.
179. See supra notes 87-97 and accompanying text (noting the state's important interest in
protecting parties unable to protect themselves and recognizing the state's power to intervene on
behalf of children in certain circumstances).
180. This is true primarily because the nature of any particular condition or disease can be in
constant flux depending on the disease itself or the type of treatment provided. As the situation
evolves, so does the decision-making process itself.
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underfinanced and overburdened, and these characteristics are not conducive
to sensitive and efficient decision-making in this context. Thus, the state
should not be considered as a viable surrogate for making these decisions.
The last potential source of surrogate decision-making authority is a guard-
ian for the child. Depending upon the type of guardianship, that individual
either manages the day-to-day affairs of the minor ward or represents the
ward in legal proceedings."' While the general guardian undertakes the for-
mer task, the guardian ad litem is a licensed attorney who can serve in both
capacities. Once appointed, the general guardian is given control over the
ward's person and is empowered to make those decisions necessary for the
ward's well-being, including those which relate to medical treatment. Because
the general guardian's role is essentially akin to that of a parent, the opportu-
nity exists to develop a close relationship. Through this relationship, the gen-
eral guardian is capable of providing the individualized attention which is nec-
essary for making the difficult decisions which affect the ward's health and
welfare. As a result, the guardian should be viewed as an important player in
resolving these disputes.
In the context of interparental disputes over medical treatment decisions,
the preferred form of guardianship should be a guardian ad litem. This indi-
vidual, through appointment as a minor's general guardian, can not only make
the general decisions necessary to safeguard the health and welfare of the
child but also can represent the child in proceedings that test the propriety of
the decisions. Because these decisions are likely to be challenged by one or
both parents, it is critical that the individual entrusted to act on behalf of the
child is able to advocate this position under emergency circumstances. More-
over, application of the substituted judgment doctrine and best interests test is
subject to judicial oversight and, consequently, the person making decisions
under either standard should be fluent in the nature and scope of these doc-
trines. By combining the roles of guardian and counsel, the guardian ad litem
is in the best position to insure that the child's interests are not only recog-
nized but also protected.
The second prong of the substantive analysis concerns the appropriate stan-
dard by which surrogate decision-making is effected. As indicated, there are
two standards that can be employed to make decisions for incompetent indi-
viduals: the substituted judgment doctrine and the best interests test.1 82 The
choice of a standard depends on whether the incompetent individual was for-
merly competent to make decisions concerning his or her medical care and, if
so, whether it is possible to discern the incompetent's prior intent concerning
these decisions . 83 If the individual was competent and his or her intent can be
181. See supra section I.E.1, notes 110-24 and accompanying text (discussing judicial appoint-
ment of a surrogate parent or guardian ad litem and the role of this party in disputes over medical
treatment).
182. See supra sections l.E.2.b and I.E.2.c, notes 136-65 and accompanying text (analyzing in
detail the components and application of these competing approaches).
183. See supra sections l.E.2.b and I.E.2.c, notes 136-65 and accompanying text.
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established by clear and convincing evidence, the constitutional respect for
bodily integrity and self-determination mandates the use of substituted judg-
ment. 84 Where the individual has never been competent or the intent cannot
be determined, the best interests approach controls. 18 5 These same principles
apply in cases involving minors whose medical treatment has been interrupted
by parental dispute.
In those cases involving emancipated or mature minors who have been or
remain competent to consent for medical treatment, the appropriate standard
for surrogate decision-making is the substituted judgment doctrine. Once it
has been established that the minor has the requisite maturity and intelligence
to make these decisions, it is imperative to attempt to discern the minor's
wishes concerning medical treatment. Perhaps the minor is capable of expres-
sing this intent. If so, no further inquiry is required. If the minor was formerly
competent but, as a result of his or her infirmity, can no longer express this
intent, a guardian ad litem should be appointed to both identify and advocate
the minor's wishes. In this situation, the guardian ad litem serves solely as a
voice for a child who can no longer speak. As long as the mature or emanci-
pated minor's right to bodily integrity and self-determination is intact, efforts
to decide for this individual must respect this right. The substituted judgment
doctrine is the only vehicle through which this can be accomplished.
The answer is different, however, in cases involving minors who, by virtue of
their age or illness, have never been competent to make these decisions. In
such cases, the minor does not possess a protected interest in directing his or
her care and must rely on a surrogate to make the necessary decisions. Under
these circumstances, the surrogate must base the decision on the course of
treatment that is in the best interests of the minor. Although the best interests
calculus is not always easy to effect, there are numerous factors that can be
considered to determine the path of greatest benefit and least harm.'8 6 Occa-
sionally, in the context of medical care, the best interests approach may favor
nontreatment of the minor.' 87 Although this is a difficult decision to make,
especially where nontreatment hastens the dying process, it nevertheless must
be made. While it may appear paradoxical to equate best interests with death,
the prospect of continued life with intractable pain and suffering may not al-
ways be justified.
There may not be a concrete method to precisely define the best interests
test. "'88 There are, however, several characteristics deserving of mention. First,
the test must be fact-specific and should focus on any and all relevant infor-
184. See supra sections l.E.2.b and I.E.2.c, notes 136-65 and accompanying text.
185. See supra sections I.E.2.b and I.E.2.c, notes 136-65 and accompanying text.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 37-38 (detailing the twelve-factor test to be applied in
the best interests calculus).
187. This may be the case where there is no hope for meaningful recovery and prolonged life
entails a great deal of pain and suffering.
188. But see In re Beth Israel Medical Ctr., 519 N.Y.S.2d 511 (Sup. Ct. 1987) (outlining the
twelve factors to consider in conducting this analysis).
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mation. In terms of information, more is better. Second, in striving to deter-
mine the best interests of the individual, the analysis must focus on creating
the greatest differential between benefit and harm. Once this balance is struck,
it is possible to identify the course of treatment that respects the best interests
of the individual. Finally, hard decisions should not be avoided. While life
itself is a presumptive good, there are situations in which continued life is
inhumane. The use of medical technology to sustain life at all costs may con-
stitute medical abuse, degrade the integrity of the individual and the medical
profession, and serve only to perpetuate an otherwise torturous dying process
both for the patient and his or her loved ones. Thus, the best interests ap-
proach must incorporate the "quality of life" not "sanctity of life"
philosophy.189
In sum, the substantive analysis can best be illustrated through the use of a
flowchart. Starting from the point at which the parents disagree, the first in-
quiry concerns the identity of the decision-maker. Because the parents are
written out of the equation, the choice involves either the child or the guardian
ad litem. If the child is competent, the result is straightforward. The child's
wishes must be respected. If the child is not competent, a guardian ad litem
must be appointed to represent the interests of the minor. First, the guardian
must ask whether the child was formerly competent to express an intent con-
cerning medical treatment. If the child was formerly competent, the guardian,
as surrogate, must strive to determine the child's previous intent and serve as
his or her voice through the doctrine of substituted judgment. If either the
child was not formerly competent or intent cannot be discerned, the guardian
must act for the child in a manner consistent with his or her best interests.
Following this substantive approach will insure that the minor's interests re-
main the paramount concern in resolving these disputes.
B. The Procedural Framework
While the substantive component of the analysis properly focused on the
health and welfare of the minor, there are several procedural aspects in this
dispute resolution that should not be overlooked. Because there are additional
interests and considerations inherent in these disputes, focusing on the process
of decision-making can help to insure these considerations are not ignored.
Specifically, there are two interests that must be addressed. First, the parents
have an interest in making medical treatment decisions. If the process can be
adjusted to help the parents avoid losing their decision-making rights, these
189. There is considerable debate on whether the appropriate focus should be "quality of life"
as opposed to "sanctity of life." Each position has strengths and weaknesses. While the former
position invites subjective judgments concerning an acceptable level of quality, the latter ignores
the fact that continued life may simply be torture at the behest of medical technology. For an
interesting discussion of these issues, see MICHAEL D. BAYLES & DALLAS M. HIGH, MEDICAL
TREATMENT OF THE DYING: MORAL ISSUES (1981); ROBERT F. WEIR, ABATING TREATMENT WITH
CRITICALLY ILL PATIENTS: ETHICAL AND LEGAL LIMITS TO THE MEDICAL PROLONGATION OF
LIFE (1989).
[Vol. 41:841
INTERSPOUSAL DISAGREEMENT
steps should be taken. Parents have, after all, a significant interest in the out-
come of the dispute. Second, there is a pressing need to keep these disputes
from going to court. The adversarial process is not conducive to the efficient
and sensitive resolution of these dilemmas. As will be shown, the use of hospi-
tal-based (institutional) ethics committees can respect both of these considera-
tions as well as serve as a forum for informal arbitration.
In designing a framework to resolve disputes between parents who disagree
over the medical treatment decisions for their children, the institutional ethics
committee is a valuable tool.19 ° Affiliated with hospitals and other health care
facilities, these committees can play two valuable roles in dispute resolution.
First, they can provide a forum for informal arbitration so that parents can
attempt to reconcile their differences before resorting to the adversarial pro-
cess.'"' In addition, these committees can serve in an advisory capacity to the
courts that may be faced with difficult ethical and legal choices.'" Before-
these functions can be analyzed, however, the nature and structure of these
committees must be identified.
The past two decades have seen the emergence and rise of the institutional
ethics committee as an integral part of the health care facility."' As medical
technology continues to evolve and greater emphasis is placed on patient rights
and participation in the medical decision-making process, physicians are in-
creasingly faced with difficult questions concerning the provision of medical
services.194 The withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, the use of experimen-
tal therapies and protocols, and the use of fetal surgery are but a few of the
numerous areas in which these questions arise. 95 In response to both physi-
cians' and.society's need for a more structured approach to these ethical quag-
mires, many hospitals have established ethics committees that promote discus-
190. For a useful bibliography on ethics committees, see PATRICIA M. MCCARRICK & JUDITH
M. ADAMS, NATIONAL REFERENCE CENTER FOR BIOETHICS LITERATURE, KENNEDY INSTITUTE OF
ETHICS. ETHICS COMMITTEES IN HOSPITALS (rev. ed. 1989). See also ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT
TO DIE 469-521 (1989) (providing an extensive overview of the structure and function of ethics
committees, including many of the legal issues arising from their operations); Symposium, Hospi-
tal Ethics Committees and the Law, 50 MD. L. REV. 742 (1991) (detailing the evolution of Mary-
land ethics committees and noting the political, functional, and policy-related difficulties that have
accompanied the movement).
191. Although arbitration is often used as a term of art, for purposes of this Comment it simply
refers to its generic meaning as a process by which disputes between individuals are resolved. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 110 (6th ed. 1990).
192. See infra notes 203-07 and accompanying text (discussing the value of institutional ethics
committees in informal dispute resolution between parents).
193. MEISEL, supra note 190, at 470-71.
194. Most of these questions address the initiation or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.
As a society, new technology allows us to keep people alive longer. The burning question that
arises, however, is whether the use of this technology promotes living or prolongs dying. See supra
note 189 (discussing the subtle differences between "quality of life" and "sanctity of life").
195. Most of these issues fall within the domain of bioethics. See generally JOHN ARRAS &
ROBERT HUNT, ETHICAL ISSUES IN MODERN MEDICINE (2d ed. 1983) (addressing many of the
pertinent issues in the field of bioethics).
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sion of the pertinent issues relating to the care of particular patients. 96 In a
nutshell:
An institutional ethics committee is a "multi-disciplinary group of health
care professionals within a health care institution that has been specifically
established to address the ethical dilemmias that occur within that institu-
tion. At the present time, these dilemmas frequently concern the treatment
or non-treatment of patients who lack decision-making capabilities....
Comprised of physicians, nurses, therapists, clergy, social workers and attor-
neys who represent a variety of disciplines, interests and points of view,
these committees are uniquely situated to provide guidance to physicians,
families and guardians when ethical dilemmas arise."7
As such, these committees provide a unique opportunity not only for sharing
values and information, but also for resolving disputes that arise in the provi-
sion of medical care. Therein lies their true value.
In the context of this Comment, the institutional ethics committee can play
a vital role by serving as a forum for informal arbitration. They not only can
help to resolve disputes before they become irreconcilable, but they also pro-
vide a vehicle through which parents can continue to participate in the deci-
sion-making process. When parents are confronted with a sick or dying child,
it is understandable that they experience stress and emotional trauma. More-
over, these emotional reactions can create an impasse that prevents them from
agreeing on the desired course of treatment. Ethics committees can provide a
forum in which parents are offered support as well as an opportunity to air
their differences. 98 The committee also can advise the parents of the available
treatment options against the backdrop of relevant medical and ethical infor-
mation.1 99 "Most importantly, ethics committees achieve these benefits 'while
assuring that decisions involving the life and death of incompetent patients
will serve their best interests.' "200 Viewed in this light, these committees offer
a much less adversarial environment than a courtroom proceeding. It is pre-
196. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 172, at 161 (1983).
197. In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 335 n.2 (Minn. 1984) (quoting Ronald E. Cranford & A.
Edward Doudera, The Emergence of Institutional Ethics Committees, 12 LAW MED. & HEALTH
CARE 13 (1984)). It should be noted that the composition of members is not limited to the various
professional disciplines within the health care sector. Such an omission would undermine the over-
all purpose of the committee, which is to entertain the most wide-ranging set of values and opin-
ions in reaching a conclusion. MEISEL, supra note 190, at 483. As a result, it is recommended that
lay persons in the community in which the health care facility is located are included in the
process. Id. In addition, it is desirable for the parents and the guardian ad litem, if appointed, to
be present as well. This also serves the requirement that the committee is representative of all
interested parties.
198. See In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 464 (N.J. 1987) (Pollock, J., concurring) (noting the
supportive role these committees play in the decision-making process); see also In re Farrel, 529
A.2d 404, 418 (N.J. 1987) (O'Hern, J., concurring) ("[S]uch a committee might have provided
aid and counsel to a physician and family facing such a decision.").
199. In re Farrel, 529 A.2d at 418 (O'Hern, J., concurring).
200. In re Jobes, 529 A.2d at 463 (Pollock, J., concurring) (quoting brief of New Jersey Public
Advocate).
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cisely within this setting that the free flow of ideas and values is promoted.
This, in turn, can contribute to the efficient and sensitive resolution of the
dispute. As a result, resort should first be made to ethics committees to at-
tempt to resolve the dispute."'1
Informal arbitration also prevents these disputes from going to court.10 2 Due
to the emotional and complex nature of these conflicts as well as the myriad
personal values and rights involved, courts are not well-equipped to resolve
these matters. There are often no clear-cut answers available, and, considering
that these disputes must be resolved quickly, it is neither realistic nor fair to
assume that courts can respond efficiently case after case. Thus, it is best to
leave the resolution of the dispute to the parties involved. The parents must
live with the consequences of the decision and, as a result, they should be the
persons to make it. Moreover, allowing the parents the chance at informal
arbitration can promote harmony in the familial relationship and help to pre-
serve the constitutional right of family privacy.2 08 In sum, an institutional eth-
ics committee would provide the ideal forum for resolving these disputes
before resort to the judicial process and the designation of a surrogate deci-
sion-maker.
There will be instances, however, where these attempts at informal arbitra-
tion fail. This does not mean that the role of the ethics committee has ended.
Rather, these groups can provide a valuable function in the resolution of these
conflicts.2 04 Through extensive discourse concerning the care of a particular
patient, the committee can generate information that can assist both the
201. Id. (Pollock, J., concurring). "Termination of treatment cases involve not only legal and
medical, but also, ethical judgments. As an aid to physicians and families, hospitals and other
health care facilities, such as nursing homes, should give serious consideration to making available
the services of ethicists and institutional ethics committees." Id. (Pollock, J., concurring). The use
of ethics committees would also stem the urge to resort immediately to the courts, a trend that the
judiciary is reluctant to condone. "[A] practice of applying to the court to confirm such a decision
would generally be inappropriate, not only because that would be a gratuitous encroachment upon
the medical profession's field of competence, but because it would be impermissibly cumbersome."
In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 649 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). "The current practice
of members of the medical profession and their associated hospitals [is to shift] the burden of
their responsibilities to the courts, to determine, in effect, whether doctors should proceed with
certain medical procedures." In re Nemser, 273 N.Y.S.2d 624, 629 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
202. See MEISEL, supra note 190, at 477 (discussing the use of institutional ethics committees
as an integral part of the medical treatment decision-making process).
203. See supra notes 65-82 and accompanying text (analyzing the parents' rights as well as
their role in their child's medical treatment).
204. "[T]he findings and advice of such groups ... ordinarily would be of great assistance to a
probate judge faced with such a difficult decision . . . [and] it [is] desirable for a judge to con-
sider such views wherever available and useful to the court." Superintendent of Belchertown State
Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 434 (Mass. 1977); see also In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 464
(N.J. 1987) (Pollock, J., concurring) ("Patient care advisory committees ... have been author-
ized by the Maryland Legislature effective as of July 1, 1987 . . . . On request of a 'petitioner', a
term that includes among others, a physician and a family member, . . . an advisory committee
'shall offer advice in cases involving individuals with life-threatening conditions.'" (quoting MD.
HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 19-370 to 19-374 (Supp. 1986)).
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guardian ad litem and the judge in his or her analysis of the issues.205 Al-
though the courts have resisted the notion that ethics committees should serve
as a substitute for judicial review,2 0 6 they have likewise acknowledged the de-
sirable role these committees can play as En adjunct to judicial review.20 7 This
belief reflects the judiciary's awareness of its own inexperience in the complex
world of medicine and bioethics and recognizes the need for expert consulta-
tion in these situations. It also supports the idea that, while judges are less
well-equipped than parents, guardians, or health care providers to make these
decisions, the likelihood of legal consequences indicate that the decision should
be supervised by a more politically accountable body. To blindly entrust these
decisions to the private community has dangerous consequences. 0 8 Neverthe-
less, ethics committees can assist guardians and the judiciary in resolving these
disputes, and this participation should be encouraged.
In addition to the above-mentioned considerations, there is also the issue
concerning the guardian ad litem.219 While this individual was previously dis-
cussed in the context of the substantive approach, the guardian ad litem also
must be mentioned in the context of procedure. The purpose of the guardian
ad litem is to safeguard the rights and interests of the minor by representing
that child, as counsel, in any proceedings in which the child is involved.2 " This
role is especially critical when the health and welfare of the minor will be
directly affected by the outcome of the dispute. This situation is common in
the context of medical treatment decisions, and the result can be of life-and-
death proportions.
Since the minor is directly affected by the outcome of the proceedings, it
only seems reasonable that he or she should have the benefit of counsel.2"
205. This is primarily the result of the multidisciplinary character of these committees. It is
inevitable that when so many viewpoints are brought together, a wealth of information will be
generated. In addition, the discussion will naturally be confined to the relevant issues:
Perhaps the most important benefit of ethics committees, indeed the characteristic
without which the courts might be less enthusiastic about them as a substitute for
judicial review, is the belief that ethics committees will identify and counsel against
decisions that are substantively impermissible or that are based on improper
motivations.
MEISEL. supra note 190, at 479.
206. E.g., Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 434 ("We take a dim view of any attempt to shift the
ultimate decision-making responsibility away from the duly established courts of proper jurisdic-
tion to any committee, panel or group, ad hoc or permanent.").
207. See, e.g., id.
208. See Andrew L. Merritt, The Tort Liability of Hospital Ethics Committees, 60 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1239 (1987) (discussing the liability of hospital ethics committees).
209. See supra section I.E.l, notes 114-23 and accompanying text (discussing at length the
guardian ad litem's role in representing the child's interests in proceedings affecting the child's
welfare).
210. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
211. See generally James K. Genden, Separate Legal Representation for Children: Protecting
the Rights and Interests of Minors in Judicial Proceedings, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 565
(1976) (analyzing the circumstances when appointment of a child advocate may be valuable and
the difficulties surrounding the use of lawyers for children); Martin Guggenheim, The Right To
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This will insure that the minor's interests and not the interests of the other
parties to the suit will remain the focus of the proceedings. Moreover, the fact
that the result may be the same with or without the presence of the guardian
ad litem is irrelevant. There is always the possibility that this individual might
make a difference, and in these situations it is necessary to err on the side of
the minor's protected interests. Although the guardian ad litem's role may be
minor and merely involve assisting the judge in effecting the best interests
calculus, this role is important enough to justify appointment of a guardian ad
litem. Appointing a guardian ad litem can only serve to bring new and inde-
pendent information to the judge's attention and perhaps result in a more ob-
jective conclusion.21 2 In all cases involving disputes over the medical treatment
decisions for minors, a guardian ad litem should be appointed to represent the
minor during the proceedings.
By focusing on procedural issues in addition to substantive analysis, it is
possible to examine ways in which the decision-making process can be im-
proved. Emphasis on informal arbitration can provide a valuable service. By
forcing the parents to discuss their differences under controlled and well-in-
formed conditions, disputes can potentially be resolved before resort to the ju-
dicial process is necessary. 13 Perhaps all that is required is communication. If
the end result avoids the appointment and use of a surrogate decision-maker,
the means that accomplish this result should be encouraged. The key, then, to
resolving these disputes is frank and earnest discussion. The ethics committee
and the guardian ad litem can promote the communicative process and, in
turn, can help to keep the medical decision-making for children where it be-
longs: with the parents.
C. Curran, Soloveichik, and Jane Doe
At this point, it is appropriate to issue a report card for the three known
cases involving disputes between parents over the medical treatment decisions
for their children.214 By examining the disposition of these cases in light of the
Be Represented but Not Heard: Reflections on Legal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 76 (1984) (discussing the negative aspects of the appointment of counsel for children); Wal-
lace F. Mlyniec, The Child Advocate in Private Custody Disputes: A Role in Search of a Stan-
dard, 16 J. FAM. L. 1 (1977) (discussing the role of child advocates in private custody disputes);
Sarah H. Ramsey, Representation of the Child in Protection Proceedings: The Determination of
Decision-Making Capacity, 17 FAM. L.Q. 287 (1983) (discussing the role of counsel for the child
in protection proceedings); Robin-Marie Lyon, Comment, Speaking for a Child: The Role of
Independent Counsel for Minors, 75 CAL. L. REV. 681 (1987) (presenting professional responsibil-
ity tenets to guide attorneys who represent minors).
212. See supra notes 204-08 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of ethics commit-
tees as an adjunct to judicial review).
213. The author does not believe that the use of ethics committees for informal arbitration
purposes will always result in the desired resolution. However, there is this possibility, and there-
fore this step in the process should be invoked wherever possible.
214. See supra notes 11-64 and accompanying text (analyzing cases involving medical treat-
ment disputes between parents).
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above-mentioned principles, it is possible to see how the results of these cases
can improve the future resolution of these disputes.
1. Curran v. Bosze
While Curran 5 can literally be viewed as a dispute between two natural
parents over a medical treatment decision, its precedential value for future
cases is quite limited. Due to the unique fact situation in Curran, this case can
be distinguished on its face. Nancy Curran had complete decision-making au-
thority to the exclusion of Tamas Bosze.2 6 Thus, while the two parents dis-
agreed, only Ms. Curran's opinion on this matter was dispositive. Absent a
showing that Ms. Curran's refusal of consent for the bone marrow procedure
was not in the best interests of her children, neither Mr. Bosze nor the court
could interfere with this decision .2 1 While opportunities may exist to criticize
the reasoning behind the court's holding, 21 8 the end result was correct. As
such, Curran v. Bosze does not provide much guidance for resolving actual
disputes between parents who have equal decision-making power with respect
to their children.2 19
2. Soloveichik v. Soloveichik
On the other hand, Soloveichik v. Soloveichik22 0 presents the exact scenario
addressed by this Comment. Miriam and Moshe Soloveichik were husband
and wife and each had the equal right to make decisions for their child.22" '
After they could not agree on Yisroel's medical treatment, both sought decla-
rations of limited guardianship to the exclusion of the other for the purpose of
managing Yisroel's care.222 In resolving this dispute, the judge conducted an
independent best interests analysis and determined that Miriam's request was
more consistent with Yisroel's welfare. 223 Consequently, he awarded her a lim-
ited guardianship to make Yisroel's medical treatment decisions.2 24
There are both positive and negative aspects to this decision. On the positive
side, the judge correctly adopted and applied a version of the best interests test
designed to quantify the benefits and burdens of a proposed course of treat-
215. Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319 (III. 1990); see supra notes 11-24 and accompanying
text (discussing the Curran case).
216. See Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1331.
217. Id.
218. See Hughes & Wood, supra note I I (criticizing the court's failure to adequately consider
the child's right to bodily integrity and the mother's right to parental autonomy).
219. This does not mean to say that Curran v. Bosze is not important. By forcing the legal
community to consider the more difficult question involving equal parents who disagree over treat-
ment decisions, this case has significant value.
220. Soloveichik v. Soloveichik, No. 89 CH 215 (III. Cir. Ct. Jan. 19, 1989).
221. Id., slip op. at 5.
222. Id. at 3.
223. Id. at 20.
224. Id.
880 [Vol. 41:841
INTERSPOUSAL DISAGREEMENT
ment.2 25 In doing so, the judge was able to effect a solution that maximized
the ratio between benefit and harm. 2 6 Second, the focus of the inquiry cen-
tered exclusively on Yisroel's interests. This approach insured that the individ-
ual whose interests were most adversely affected by the decision was ade-
quately considered during the proceeding. Finally, the judge was not afraid to
make a difficult decision. By awarding Miriam the limited guardianship, the
judge implicitly sanctioned a course of therapy that did not prolong Yisroel's
dying process. The judge realized that, under the circumstances, continued life
did not maximize the ratio between benefit and burden. Although the judge
was not in an enviable position, he was able to efficiently and sensitively weigh
the interests and quickly arrive at a solution.
There are a few steps, however, that should have been observed. While the
result of this case may have been the same whether or not these procedural
suggestions were followed, there is no measurable degree of certainty in this
conclusion. First, the judge should have appointed a guardian ad litem either
to make decisions on behalf of Yisroel or to help the judge in effecting the best
interests test. 227 This individual can provide objective and independent infor-
mation when weighing the risks and benefits of a proposed course of treat-
ment. Moreover, because the guardian ad litem is appointed to represent the
child, the potential that conflicts of interests will infect the proceedings is re-
duced. Second, there were no attempts to use the hospital's internal ethics
committee for the purpose of informal arbitration. 228 While this step may not
have resolved the parental disagreement, there is a chance it would have been
successful. Because informal arbitration offers an opportunity to resolve the
dispute between parents outside of the adversarial process, it should be utilized
whenever possible.
3. In re Jane Doe
The case of In re Jane Doe also involved a dispute between two parents
equally situated with respect to medical decision-making.229 In Jane Doe, the
mother wanted a Do Not Resuscitate ("DNR") order issued for her daughter
and was ambivalent on the issue of whether the extraordinary life-sustaining
treatment should be discontinued. 2 0 The father, on the other hand, adamantly
225. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (presenting the multi-factor analysis used by
the Soloveichik court to evaluate the child's best interests).
226. Specifically, the judge found that additional surgery would not yield any additional benefit
and would contribute to Yisroel's pain and suffering. Soloveichik, No. 89 Ch 215, slip op. at 19.
Hence, the option of no additional surgery, which did not decrease the harm/benefit ratio, was the
only acceptable option.
227. See supra section I.EI, notes 114-24 and accompanying text (reviewing the respective
roles of the guardian ad litem and the surrogate guardian).
228. See supra section I.B., notes 190-201 and accompanying text (discussing the procedural
framework for resolving medical treatment disputes between parents).
229. In re Jane Doe, Civ. No. D-93064 (Ga. Super. Ct. Oct. 17, 1991) (published in Fulton
County Daily Report, Oct. 18, 1991).
230. Id., slip op. at 7.
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opposed both of these options and wanted everything done to keep his daugh-
ter alive.2 - 1 The court, focusing almost exclusively on the rights of both par-
ents to make medical treatment decisions for their children, refused to inter-
vene on behalf of the mother or the hospital.23 2 As a result, Jane Doe
languished in a semiconscious state with no hope for meaningful recovery, kept
alive by the "virtues" of medical technology.2 33
Unfortunately, there are significant problems with this decision. By focusing
on the fundamental rights of the parents, the court ignored the subject of the
dispute. There were no efforts to independently determine whether Jane Doe's
continued and technologically assisted life was in her best interests. The court
simply held, absent a showing of abuse or neglect, it did not have the power to
intervene in the dispute and favor one parent over the other. There are two
implicit errors in this holding. First, the court refused to recognize the concept
of medical abuse. Several parties, including the hospital, the ethics committee,
Jane Doe's physicians, and her mother, believed the continued use of ex-
traordinary measures was inhumane because it merely prolonged the painful
process of dying.2"4 The court, disregarding this argument, concluded that the
inherent uncertainties in medical science mitigated the unanimous medical
opinion that there was no hope for meaningful recovery.235 This conclusion
was neither realistic nor practical.3 6 A judge is trained in the law, not
medicine. Because the question of meaningful recovery is a medical question, a
judge should defer to the unanimous opinion of medical experts. In addition,
there are few, if any, absolute certaintie; in this world. Therefore, if absolute
certainty were required before actions are justified, even those involving life
and death, the fruits of technological and social progress could not be enjoyed.
While medicine may not be an exact science, knowledge and technology have
provided the medical community with trustworthy indicia of probabilities. To
ignore such probability in the face of unanimous expert opinion only serves to
fetter the provision of competent and humane services.
Next, by refusing to intervene and resolve this dispute under the guise of
treating both parents equally, the court actually favored the father's request to
the exclusion of the mother. This approach clearly does not respect the inter-
23 I. Id.
232. Id. at 18.
233. As a postscript, Jane Doe died eight days after the conclusion of the proceedings. During
this period of time, she was resuscitated twice. The third attempt failed. Telephone Interview with
Susan Devitt, Attorney, Alston & Bird (Mar. 2, 1992). Ms. Devitt represented the hospital in the
Jane Doe litigation.
234. In re Jane Doe, Civ. No. D-93064, slip op. at 8.
235. Id. at 19.
236. Although uncertainty exists in the practice of medicine, uncertainty needs to be assessed
in terms of probabilities and possibilities. There is a difference in saying an event is probable as
opposed to possible. The former implies likelihood whereas the latter implies chance. Mere possi-
bility, especially where remote, should not, in and of itself, justify action or inaction. Here, there
was a remote possibility, based on the inherent uncertainty in medical science, that Jane Doe
would achieve some degree of meaningful recovery. This chance for a miracle, however, should not
have assumed such a central role in the proceedings.
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ests of both parents.2"' Moreover, it does not justify the failure to examine the
best interests of the child. If the court were truly concerned with treating both
parents equally, it would have disregarded their wishes equally and searched
for a solution that best respected the interests of Jane Doe. The court's refusal
to intervene should not be viewed any differently from the parents' inability to
act. Nothing was accomplished, and, as a result, Jane Doe's suffering
continued. 218
Although a guardian ad litem was appointed to represent Jane Doe, this
individual was rendered ineffective by the court's approach to these issues. Be-
cause the court focused almost exclusively on parental rights, the appointment
of the guardian appeared to involve more style than substance. Finally, there
were no attempts to utilize the ethics committee as a forum for informal arbi-
tration. Considering the court's refusal to accept the recommendations of the
committee, however, this is not surprising. This result is not consistent with
the deference paid to the parental rights by the court. As indicated, the ethics
committee provides parents with a forum in which to work out their differ-
ences and still retain decision-making authority over their children.239 The
Jane Doe court simply refused to intervene in the dispute and, as a result, left
the parents in the same position as they were when they walked in the front
door of the courthouse. The court's respect for the parents' rights not only
failed to accomplish the desired goal but also violated the interests of Jane
Doe.
CONCLUSION
Disputes between parents over the medical treatment decisions for their sick
children involve primarily moral and medical issues. While this Comment fo-
cuses on the appropriate legal resolution of these disputes, it must be empha-
sized that resort to the legal process should only occur when all other attempts
fail. This process is unduly burdensome and its actors are not well-equipped to
resolve these highly personal dilemmas, which necessarily occur under time
constraints and during periods of emotional duress. Through efforts to keep
these disputes where they belong, it is possible to assure the participation of
those individuals most affected by these decisions as well as to respect the
diversity of values that provide the foundation of a democratic society.
Unfortunately, some of these disputes are going to find their way into the
judicial process. In light of this fact, this Comment attempts to outline a
method through which disputes can be resolved in an efficient and sensitive
manner. Hopefully, when these situations arise in the future, all the involved
237. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (noting that each parent as an individual is
vested with fundamental parental rights).
238. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing the In re Jane Doe court's determi-
nation to displace a parental decision).
239. See supra notes 191-203 and accompanying text (presenting a suggested procedural
framework and other aspects involved in resolving medical treatment disputes between parents).
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parties will be able to do more than struggle through on an ad hoc basis. If
that is the case, this Comment serves its purpose.
Matthew S. Feigenbaum
